On July 26, 2000, Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel granted a preliminary injunction against Napster. On July 28, 2000, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal. Although the appellate court has ordered
that the matter be handled on an expedited basis, it appears that an appellate decision will likely be 3-6 months in coming.
In the interim, Napster remains free to continue to operate as it has been.
Although the preliminary injunction has been stayed pending appeal, the court's rationale may have important implications
not just for Napster, but for a wide range of Internet companies. The following is a brief summary of the court's oral ruling.
This summary is intended only for informational purposes and must remain tentative, as the court has not yet issued its written
opinion.
The Facts
The Preliminary Injunction
The Court's Rationale
Direct Copyright Infringement by Napster Users
Contributory Infringement
Vicarious Infringement
Other Napster Defenses
Irreparable Injury
The Injunction
Possible Implications
The Facts
The Napster service allows individuals with Internet access to share their own stored MP3-encoded music files directly with
other users who are running the Napster software at the same time. The Napster service is made up of two components--the free
Napster client software, which a user downloads from the Napster website and installs onto his or her PC, and numerous Napster
servers, which centrally administer the system by keeping track of which users are logged on and what MP3 files they have
made available. As of July 2000, there were estimated to be more than 20 million Napster users sharing well over 1 million music tracks at
any particular moment.
A number of record companies filed suit against Napster in December 1999, alleging contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.
Several music publishers filed a similar suit in January 2000. In March, the district court ruled that the 512(a) safe harbor
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which shield Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and similar entities
from certain copyright actions, did not protect Napster. Both the record company and music publishing plaintiffs subsequently
moved for a preliminary injunction.
The Preliminary Injunction
The court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs had demonstrated a strong likelihood
of success on the merits of their contributory and vicarious copyright infringement claims, as well as irreparable injury
in the absence of injunctive relief pending trial.
The Court's Rationale
Direct Copyright Infringement by Napster Users
To begin, the court held that plaintiffs had successfully established that the users of the Napster service were directly
infringing plaintiffs' copyrights by copying and distributing copyrighted works without their permission. In dismissing Napster's
argument that its users were engaged in "fair use" of the copyrighted works, Judge Patel indicated that the downloading of
music tracks by end users in order to determine whether they want to purchase a CD does not qualify as fair use. Also, the
court found that making a work generally available to the public did not constituted a "noncommercial personal use" within
the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The court also rejected the argument that Napster users were entitled to the benefit of the "noncommercial home copying" exception created by the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA), 17 USC § 1008. Relying on RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999), the court held that the AHRA had no application to Napster users because that provision is
limited only to "digital audio recording devices" (DARDs). Because the Diamond Multimedia opinion held that computer hard drives are not DARDs, the court found that Napster users fell outside the reach of the AHRA's
"noncommercial home copying" exception.
Contributory Infringement
Having laid a foundation of direct infringement by Napster users, the court went on to find that the plaintiffs had established
a strong likelihood of success on their contributory infringement claim. In arriving at this conclusion, the court found that
Napster had actual, or, at a minimum, constructive knowledge of the infringing activities of its users. The court was also
satisfied that Napster had materially contributed to these infringing activities insofar at the Napster software assists and
facilitates the sharing of MP3 music files.
Vicarious Infringement
The court went on to hold that plaintiffs had also shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their vicarious liability
claim. In coming to this conclusion, the court determined that Napster's practice of terminating users after receiving complaints
regarding them demonstrates Napster's "supervisory control" over its users. In addition, the court found that Napster received
a financial benefit from the infringing activities of its users because these activities attracted a large user base, which
in turn attracted investors in the company. In addition, the court was not persuaded by the fact that Napster's services are
provided free of charge--the court noted that Napster was founded as a commercial venture and that its officers intended to
make a profit at some point.
Other Napster Defenses
Napster had also hoped to take shelter behind the "staple article of commerce" principle enunciated in the Sony case, also known as the "Betamax defense." The Supreme Court in the Sony case held that manufacturers are not liable for contributory infringement when they sell a product that can be used for infringing
purposes by end users, so long as the product is capable of a substantial noninfringing use. The district court rejected Napster's
reliance on this argument, finding that any noninfringing uses of the Napster service were not "commercially substantial."
Judge Patel went on to observe that Sony does not apply where the vendor has a continuing relationship with the user after the product has been sold. The court rejected
Napster's remaining defenses--copyright misuse, First Amendment, and waiver--with only minimal comment.
Irreparable Injury
In finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated irreparable injury, the court relied on the presumption of irreparable harm
that arises in copyright cases once there has been a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits. The court found that
Napster had not rebutted this presumption.
The Injunction
Based on its finding of a strong likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury, the court granted plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction was to take effect at midnight on Friday, June 28, 2000. However, the
injunction was stayed by the Ninth Circuit pending appeal. Had the injunction gone into effect, it would have required that
Napster cease facilitating or contributing to the infringement of any of the sound recordings or musical works owned by plaintiffs.
In the wake of the stay pending appeal, Napster can continue to operate. At the same time, the plaintiffs' damages continue
to mount, and now that the Court has ruled on its copyright defenses, the plaintiffs are likely to argue with additional vigor
that ongoing infringement is willful, thereby adding to Napster's financial exposure.[1]
Possible Implications
Although the preliminary injunction has been stayed pending appeal, the legal principles announced in the Napster ruling may
have implications for many Internet businesses, especially those whose users may be engaging in copyright infringement. Some possible implications include:
Constructive knowledge of copyright infringement may be enough to strip an online service provider of DMCA safe harbor protections. In rejecting Napster's 512(d) defense (the DMCA safe harbor that applies to information location tools), the court ruled
that the fact that Napster had "actual, or at least constructive, knowledge" was enough to deprive it of the safe harbor.
This has the potential to be a disquieting ruling for companies that have been relying on the 512(d) safe harbor, especially
for those companies who have generalized knowledge that many of their users may be engaged in substantial copyright infringement.
The "Betamax defense" announced by the Supreme Court in the Sony decision may not apply to businesses that combine a product with ongoing services. Where a manufacturer sells a product that has infringing uses (such as a VCR), the Sony decision has generally been understood to operate as shield against contributory infringement liability so long as the product
is capable of a substantial noninfringing uses. Judge Patel intimated that this defense does not apply where the defendant
maintains a continuing relationship with the product after it is sold. This holding may be troubling for companies that hope
to use the Internet to maintain a continuing relationship with those who use their products.
The power to terminate a user may lead to vicarious infringement liability. Judge Patel found that Napster's demonstrated ability to terminate infringing users was enough "supervisory control" to satisfy
the "control" element of vicarious infringement. Given that most companies that provide services over the Internet retain
the right to terminate their users, this holding could increase the potential for vicarious copyright infringement, even where
a company has no knowledge of the infringing activities. A policy of terminating users who repeatedly engage in infringing
activities, moreover, is a prerequisite for the DMCA safe harbors generally. Accordingly, this aspect of Judge Patel's order
may put companies in the unfortunate position of accepting an increased risk for vicarious liability in order to qualify for
the DMCA safe harbors.
If the infringing activities of users are part of a service's appeal and ultimately attract investors, this may be enough
to satisfy the "financial benefit" element of vicarious infringement. This may be true, moreover, even if the services are provided free of charge and the company is not making a profit. Many
Internet services derive at least a portion of their value from user activities that are not wholly legitimate, from a copyright
point of view. The court's decision in the Napster case may expose these companies to additional risks.
The foregoing analysis is based upon the district court's oral ruling on July 26, 2000. Morrison & Foerster's Internet and
new media groups will be reviewing the district court's written opinion closely when it is issued in order to evaluate what
effect the decision is likely to have.
[1] Indeed, should the case reach the damages stage, the plaintiffs may also argue that Napster's officers and directors are personally
liable for the infringement.