Protecting privilege while using AI is not as straightforward as you might think. A new decision out of the Southern District of New York establishes that the use of free or public large language models to create documents—without having been directed by counsel—may not be protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, even if they are later shared with counsel. United States v. Heppner, No. 25-cr-00503-JSR (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026), Dkt. No. 27 (“Mem.”).
In Heppner, the court denied protection for AI-generated materials, emphasizing three facts:
(1) the defendant used a publicly available AI tool with terms that defeated any reasonable expectation of confidentiality; (2) he acted without counsel’s direction; and (3) the materials did not reflect counsel’s mental impressions when created. Heppner, Mem. at 6–7, 9–10; United States v. Heppner, No. 25-cr-00503-JSR, Tr. of Feb. 10, 2026 Conference at 3, 5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2026) (“Tr.”).
In light of this decision, organizations using generative AI in connection with sensitive legal matters should consider the following:
After executing a search warrant, law enforcement seized electronic devices containing approximately 31 documents memorializing the defendant’s communications with a generative AI platform. Heppner, Mem. at 3. Defense counsel represented that defendant used the AI tool to prepare “reports” outlining potential defense strategies after receiving a grand jury subpoena—without counsel’s direction. Id. The defendant asserted attorney-client privilege and work product protection, arguing that the documents were created to facilitate discussions with counsel and were later shared with counsel. Id. at 3–4. The court rejected both claims. Id. at 1, 4; Tr. at 6.
To qualify for attorney-client privilege, a communication must be made (1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that is intended to be, and in fact was, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice. The court concluded the AI documents lacked “at least two, if not all three” required elements. Heppner, Mem. at 5.
First, the court concluded that the AI tool was not an attorney, and communications with it were not attorney-client communications. Id.
Second—and most significant for organizations evaluating the use of AI tools—the court held that the communications were not confidential because the defendant used a publicly available third-party AI platform with a written privacy policy that put users on notice that the provider collected both user inputs and tool outputs, used the data to train the tool, and reserved the right to disclose the data to third parties, including government authorities. Id. at 6–7. Accordingly, the court found no reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Id. at 7. In effect, the court treated the public AI platform as a third party for privilege purposes, and the governing contractual terms were central to the confidentiality analysis.
The court’s reasoning suggests that enterprise or private-instance tools with contractual safeguards may strengthen confidentiality arguments, but safeguards alone are unlikely to suffice absent clear counsel direction and litigation purpose.
Third, the court rejected the idea that later sharing the AI-created documents with counsel could retroactively create privilege. Even if the defendant intended to share the communications with counsel and ultimately did so, non-privileged communications are not “alchemically changed” into privileged ones merely because they are later transferred to counsel. Id. at 8.
The court likewise rejected work product protection. Although the documents may have been created in anticipation of litigation, the defendant generated them independently and they did not reflect counsel’s strategy at the time. Heppner, Tr. at 5; Mem. at 9–10. Because the defendant was not acting as counsel’s agent, the materials were not counsel-directed litigation preparation. Heppner, Mem. at 10. While work product protection can extend to non-lawyers, its purpose is to protect “the mental processes of the attorney,” not a client’s independently generated strategy analysis. Id. at 11.
The Heppner decision highlights several core considerations for organizations structuring AI use for sensitive legal matters: