Quantum Readiness Begins Now: What Organizations Should Do to Prepare

19 Nov 2026
Client Alert

For years, the prospect of quantum computers capable of breaking widely used cryptographic techniques has been viewed as a future risk. That framing is becoming harder to sustain as developments in quantum computing accelerate.

On October 27, 2026, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) issued its final roadmap for transitioning from quantum-vulnerable cryptography to post-quantum cryptography (“PQC”).[1] The roadmap follows NIST’s publication of its first PQC standards in 2024[2] and gives organizations a clearer framework to adopt alternative cryptographic methods that will be more resistant to quantum computers.

The United States is not alone in raising this as a pressing concern. The European Union’s coordinated PQC roadmap calls for Member States to begin transitioning to PQC by the end of 2026, with high-risk use cases targeted for transition by the end of 2030.[3] The UK National Cyber Security Centre (“NCSC”) similarly recommends completing discovery and initial migration planning by 2028, addressing the highest-priority systems by 2031, and working toward broader migration by 2035.[4]

Today’s cryptographic protections have not suddenly become insecure, and at this time, there is no publicly known quantum computer capable of breaking widely used public-key cryptography. However, organizations should consider what steps they need to take now to identify and migrate their cryptographic dependencies before these quantum computers are available.

Why This Matters

“Steal Now, Decrypt Later” Creates a Risk Today

As we discussed earlier this year (see our previous publication), threat actors are seeking to exfiltrate encrypted information that they can retain and then later decrypt once quantum computers are available. This is commonly referred to as a technique called “Steal Now, Decrypt Later” or “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (“HN/DL”). The HN/DL threat is one reason organizations should work now to prioritize PQC migration for sensitive information that may have a long “shelf life” of usefulness, such as government and national security information, intellectual property, sensitive individual information, authentication material, and long-term commercial strategies.

The Issue Is Broader Than Confidentiality

Cryptography does more than keep secrets. It underpins authentication, digital signatures, certificates, software integrity, and trusted communications.

A sufficiently capable quantum computer could therefore threaten the tools an organization relies on to decide whom and what to trust. Given this, NIST’s roadmap addresses both quantum-resistant key-establishment mechanisms and digital-signature algorithms.

For legal and risk teams, the takeaway is that quantum readiness is more than a data-encryption project. It ultimately touches identity, software development, digital certificates, communications, transactions, and other systems that rely on public-key cryptography.

Migration Will Not Be a “Flip the Switch” Exercise

Cryptography is everywhere, often in places organizations do not expect. In a large organization, it can sit in thousands of places, from applications and cloud services to hardware, third-party products, and legacy systems.

Some systems will be relatively easy to update. Others rely on technology that was never designed to accommodate a new cryptographic algorithm. This is the challenge of “cryptographic agility,” meaning whether an organization can change the cryptography a system uses without rebuilding the system itself. It is also why both NIST and the NCSC emphasize discovery, inventory, prioritization, and supply-chain dependencies before migration begins.[5]

What Should Organizations Do Now?

There are six concrete steps organizations can take now to prepare for “Q-Day”—the point at which a sufficiently capable quantum computer can compromise widely used quantum-vulnerable cryptography:

1. Identify Where Your Cryptography Is Now

Organizations cannot migrate cryptographical techniques if they don’t know their current status, so the first step is a cryptographic inventory. In practice, this means mapping where cryptography is used, which algorithms and protocols are involved, what information each system protects, and who, inside or outside the organization, controls the technology.

This exercise can bring hidden dependencies to light. A critical business process may turn out to rely on cryptography built into a third-party product, a cloud service, certificate infrastructure, a hardware device, or a legacy application. Once that picture is clear, the inventory provides the basis for deciding which systems to migrate first and how to do so without disrupting critical systems or operations.

2. Prioritize Data That Will Remain Sensitive for Years to Come

Not every system presents the same risk. Organizations should weigh both how sensitive certain information is now and how long it will remain sensitive. This analysis can help identify whether PQC migration, additional safeguards, or accelerated data minimization should come first.

3. Build Cryptographic Agility Into the Roadmap

The next question is whether important systems can move to new cryptographic standards without a substantial redesign. Where they cannot, the fix may involve much more than swapping one algorithm for another. It may mean software changes, new hardware, replacing legacy systems, or waiting on a supplier to act.

As new cryptographic standards are adopted, organizations should not only consider how they can move to a recognized PQC method, but how that system can change to a different PQC method as techniques evolve and improve. All of this takes time, planning, executive commitment, and funding. That is why quantum migration should be incorporated into ongoing technology life cycle management, procurement, and cybersecurity planning, and not just as a standalone project for the future.

4. Ask Vendors About Their PQC Plans

For many organizations, much of the migration will depend on third parties. Organizations should therefore consider building quantum readiness into their current vendor-management and procurement processes, asking questions such as:

  • Where does the product or service rely on quantum-vulnerable cryptography?
  • Does the provider have a documented PQC migration roadmap?
  • Will upgrades require new hardware or material architectural changes?
  • What is the provider’s expected timeline?
  • Can the product support multiple cryptographic standards during a transition period?

5. Implement Data Minimization and Revisit Data Retention

Quantum computing also reinforces an old lesson: data minimization matters. Organizations should look for information they have kept but do not need, or for opportunities to further minimize data. This can materially reduce the volume of information potentially exposed now and in the future following a security incident, including a HN/DL attack.

6. Update Incident Response Plans

Organizations should consider how quantum-related threats may affect their incident-response planning and risk assessments. Legal, cybersecurity, and incident-response teams should prepare for scenarios involving compromised cryptographic keys or credentials, the exfiltration of encrypted information that may be vulnerable to future decryption, and the potential compromise of authentication and digital-signature mechanisms.

Governance Remains Front and Center

PQC is also starting to feature in broader cybersecurity governance expectations. In the EU, for example, the GDPR requires organizations to take account of the “state of the art” when implementing security measures, while the EU’s Network and Information Systems Directive (“NIS 2”) similarly requires covered entities to take account of state-of-the-art measures and expressly addresses policies and procedures relating to cryptography and encryption. Neither law requires immediate migration to PQC. But as standards, official roadmaps, and commercially available solutions develop, organizations should consider how quantum readiness fits into their broader assessment of appropriate and reasonable security measures. For multinational organizations, PQC is likely to become an increasingly important consideration in regulatory discussions, customer requirements, procurement exercises, security questionnaires, and contractual negotiations.

The Bottom Line

No one knows exactly when a quantum computer that can break existing cryptographic techniques will arrive, but it is clear that readiness and migration will take time. The immediate priority is to understand your data, where cryptography is being used, how you will migrate, and which supplier dependencies exist.

For many organizations, the first steps may seem relatively straightforward: build the inventory, identify the highest-risk data and systems, assess cryptographic agility, engage key suppliers, and establish a phased migration roadmap. However, these steps may take years to fully accomplish. Quantum computers are not yet capable of defeating widely used public-key cryptography, but quantum readiness should already be a board‑level issue.


[1] Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (Oct. 2026).

[2] Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., FIPS 203, Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (Aug. 13, 2024); FIPS 204, Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (Aug. 13, 2024); FIPS 205, Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard (Aug. 13, 2024).

[3] NIS Cooperation Group, A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (June 2025).

[4] Nat’l Cyber Sec. Ctr., Timelines for Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (Mar. 20, 2025).

[5] See NIST IR 8547, supra note 1, §§ 1, 2.2, 3, at 1, 5-6; Nat’l Cyber Sec. Ctr., supra note 4, “Discovery and assessment” and “Developing your migration plan.” 

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Because of the generality of this update, the information provided herein may not be applicable in all situations and should not be acted upon without specific legal advice based on particular situations. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.