In Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co, — F.4th —, No. 25-2205 (7th Cir. May 29, 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit joined the Second Circuit in holding that the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Hague Service Convention”) prohibits email service in mainland China.
The case involved Kangol LLC, a clothing company, bringing a trademark infringement and counterfeiting action against e-commerce vendors, most of which are based in mainland China. The district court permitted Kangol to serve the vendors, including Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd. (“Chuanyue”), by email, which Kangol did. Chuanyue initially did not appear, and the district court entered a default judgment. Chuanyue subsequently appeared and moved to vacate the default judgment on the ground that the Hague Service Convention prohibits email service in mainland China. The district court denied the motion, and Chuanyue appealed.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision regarding the permissibility of service by email in China under the Hague Service Convention. Relying on a line of Supreme Court decisions from Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. D. Ct. for the S.D. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987), including Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U.S. 271 (2017), as well as the text and structure of the Convention (Articles 1, 11, and 19 in particular), the appellate court held that the Convention “describes all permissible service methods and excludes all other [] practices.” “And because no provision of the Convention authorizes service by email in China, such service violates the Convention and [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 4(f)(3).” This holding is consistent with the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Smart Study Co., Ltd v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi, 164 F.4th 164 (2d Cir. 2025), as explained in our prior alert reviewing the court’s opinion in that case.
Despite siding with Chuanyue on the interpretation of the Hague Service Convention, the Seventh Circuit did not grant Chuanyue’s motion outright. Instead, it remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the Convention applies at all. Because the Convention applies only where the address of the person to be served is known, the district court needed to determine whether Chuanyue’s address was known at the time of attempted service. As the court further noted, that inquiry typically requires a review of a plaintiff’s efforts to identify a defendant’s address, and the district court had not yet resolved whether Kangol’s efforts were sufficiently diligent.
The Court left open several other issues that it did not need to decide to reach its decision but warrant attention for litigants who might find themselves in similar disputes. As in Smart Study, the Seventh Circuit left open whether “postal channels” in Article 10 of the Convention—an article to which mainland China has objected—includes email service. The Court also left open under what circumstances a defendant should be found to have waited too long to raise an objection to proper service. As the Court explained, a “defendant waives an objection to improper service if he ‘gives a plaintiff a reasonable expectation that he will defend the suit on the merits or where he causes the court to go to some effort that would be wasted if personal jurisdiction is subsequently found lacking.’” Precisely what conduct rises to the level described by the Seventh Circuit to constitute such a waiver is likely to be contested in other cases to come.