MOFCOM Places the Responsible Business Alliance on China’s Countermeasure List: Considerations for Companies Relying on RBA Audits in China

On August 5, 2026, the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) Order No. 2 of 2026 took effect, placing six U.S. entities on China’s[1] countermeasure list under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (the “AFSL”). The listed entities are the Responsible Business Alliance (“RBA”); Applied DNA Sciences; Stratum Reservoir; Altana Technologies; Verite Group; and Human Rights in China. The countermeasure prohibits organizations and individuals within China from engaging in transactions, cooperation, and other activities with the listed entities.

For a wide range of multinational companies (“MNCs”), the listing of RBA has significant potential consequences. RBA is the platform through which a substantial share of supplier diligence and certification is conducted in China for various subjects, including anti-corruption, environmental, labor, and sanctions compliance. The listing therefore creates a two-way conflict: the audit evidence that customers, and even foreign authorities in certain circumstances, expect companies to produce for their China-based suppliers has commonly been generated through the very platform that the new countermeasure now prohibits organizations and individuals in China from using. Companies that rely on RBA diligence in China may consider the potential mitigation steps set out in Section IV below.

I. The Countermeasure Action

MOFCOM imposed the countermeasure under the AFSL, which empowers Chinese authorities to adopt countermeasures against “foreign discriminatory restrictive measures” and against parties that implement or assist in implementing them.

The countermeasure order itself is brief. As to RBA, it states only that RBA “assisted and supported” U.S. Xinjiang-related sanctions. It does not identify the specific conduct, audit standards, or data practices said to constitute that assistance. Notably, although the order does not expressly name RBA’s sub-initiatives, the listing is likely broad enough to capture them, including the Responsible Minerals Initiative (“RMI”), a multi‑industry program that develops due diligence standards, third-party audit programs, and reporting tools for smelters, refiners, and mineral supply chains. Because a significant share of the world’s critical mineral processors are located in China and have relied on RMI’s Responsible Minerals Assurance Process for independent assessment and market access, the countermeasure has the potential to disrupt due diligence across critical mineral supply chains at a time of heightened demand for these materials.

MOFCOM’s countermeasure action came only five days after the U.S. added 43 China-based companies to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (“UFLPA”) Entity List on July 31, 2026.[2] MOFCOM has not stated a connection between the two.

II. Reported Basis for the Listing

Chinese-language market commentators[3] have offered explanations for the listing. That commentary is not part of the order and has not been endorsed by Chinese authorities but serves as useful context for the likely rationale and for the sensitivities MNCs may wish to avoid when evaluating their China audit processes. The recurring themes are summarized as below:

• Embedding UFLPA requirements into commercial audit standards. Certain market commentators suggest that RBA’s Code of Conduct version 8.0 (January 2024) and its Validated Assessment Program (“VAP”) protocol require suppliers to demonstrate the absence of Xinjiang-sourced materials and Xinjiang-linked labor, converting a U.S. sanctions objective into a commercial market-access condition.
• Serving as a data conduit for U.S. enforcement. According to this commentary, RBA’s factory audit records, employment data, and supply chain mapping are a critical input to U.S. UFLPA detentions of goods at the border and Entity List designations.
• Driving supply chain decoupling through member brands. Commentators said that RBA member companies, primarily U.S. technology purchasers, have used the RBA framework to require upstream suppliers to sever Xinjiang-connected sourcing.
• Alleged double standards in audit practice. Commentators said that VAP auditors have applied materially more stringent scrutiny to Xinjiang-related labor and sourcing issues in Chinese factories than to comparable issues in U.S. and European facilities.

III. Scope of the Restrictions

MOFCOM’s stated countermeasure is to “prohibit organizations and individuals within [China] from engaging in relevant transactions, cooperation, and other activities with the listed persons” (禁止我国境内的组织、个人与其进行有关交易、合作等活动). MOFCOM imposes no asset freeze and no entry ban against RBA or the other five listed entities.

Key features of the scope include:

• “Relevant transactions and cooperation” is drafted broadly. Article 8 of the Implementing Provisions of the AFSL extends the concept to activities, including, but not limited to, education, science and technology, legal services, environmental protection, trade, culture, tourism, health, and sport, administered across multiple ministries. In the context of RBA, this means that membership, working‑group participation, training, and data submission are all plausibly captured, whether or not consideration changes hands.
• Continued use of RBA-branded materials may be a gray zone. Using RBA-branded or accredited questionnaires, templates, and protocols without active RBA involvement could potentially be viewed as continuing or reinforcing cooperation with a listed entity. AFSL enforcement discretion is broad, and where the object of a countermeasure is the assurance system rather than a single counterparty, continued reliance on that system’s instruments potentially carries risk even absent contact with the entity.
• The prohibition reaches organizations and individuals within China. The countermeasure’s original language prohibits “organizations and individuals within China” from engaging with sanctioned entities. On a strict reading, this covers foreign-invested enterprises and foreign nationals present in China, not only PRC-domiciled companies and PRC nationals. Personnel of an MNC’s China entities are therefore within scope in their own right.
• Penalties for non-compliance are administrative and operationally significant. Where an organization or individual within China is found to have violated a countermeasure prohibition, Article 13 of the Implementing Provisions of the AFSL provides for orders to rectify and for restrictions on government procurement, tendering, import and export, international services trade, cross-border data transfer, and exit from or residence in China.

IV. Mitigation Steps for MNCs to Consider

MNCs that work with RBA to conduct supplier diligence in China may consider a coordinated, multijurisdictional approach, working with PRC, U.S., and EU counsel to balance competing regulatory expectations. In the short term, to mitigate AFSL risks, MNCs may consider the following steps:

1. Mapping Out and Evaluating RBA Touchpoints in China. Consider mapping out all channels through which China-based entities and personnel interact with RBA, including any audits in progress or scheduled at China-based suppliers, and evaluating whether and how to adjust them in light of the AFSL countermeasure. This mapping exercise may also extend to RBA-branded or sourced diligence materials used within China, including those embedded in supplier contracts, internal audit manuals, and third-party auditor engagements, to evaluate whether alternative instruments may be appropriate.
2. Plan the Method and Timing of External Communications. Evaluate how and when to communicate with customers, business partners, and customs and other government agencies about the effect of this action on supply chain certifications they may be expecting in the near term. MNCs facing UFLPA diligence expectations should assess what alternative evidence can be produced, and on what timeline.

As further explained in the Terms / Notices linked below, the information provided herein is not legal advice. Any information concerning the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not an opinion on, determination on, or certification of the application of PRC law. We are not licensed to practice PRC law.

[1] For the purpose of this article, “China” or “Chinese” refers to Mainland China and excludes the regions of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.

[2] See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces the Addition of 43 Companies to the UFLPA Entity List,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/07/31/dhs-announces-addition-43-companies-uflpa-entity-list.

[3] See, e.g., MOFCOM Implemented Countermeasures Against RMA, Sina Finance.