OCC Proposed Rule Implementing the GENIUS Act: A Summary and Analysis

On February 25, 2026, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) released a much anticipated notice of proposed rulemaking (“Proposal”) to implement the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (“GENIUS Act”). The Proposal applies to the issuance of payment stablecoins and certain related activities by entities that are subject to the OCC’s jurisdiction. Comments on the Proposal are currently due May 1, 2026.

The Proposal marks the OCC’s first formal rulemaking under the GENIUS Act and represents a significant milestone toward full federal implementation of the new stablecoin regulatory framework. While it does not apply to entities that are subject to the jurisdiction of other primary federal payment stablecoin regulators or any state payment stablecoin regulator, it covers a lot of ground, signals additional forthcoming rulemakings (e.g., on anti-money laundering requirements), and may be a bellwether for future regulatory proposals. Certain provisions in the Proposal would, if finalized, have significant impacts on non-issuers and the broader legislative process involving the CLARITY Act.

We summarize the Proposal’s key takeaways below, before providing a summary of the Proposal’s scope and requirements.

Key Takeaways

Scope

Requirements

Key Takeaways

1. A coordinated post-GENIUS Act rulemaking agenda published by each federal payment stablecoin regulator would allow commenters to anticipate and consider interrelated rulemakings holistically and efficiently. Consistent with Congress’s intent—and as a means of mitigating the risk of disparate rules—federal payment stablecoin regulators should strive for “coordinated issuance,” ideally issuing final interagency rules that cover common ground.

The Proposal represents a meaningful milestone in the early phase of post-GENIUS Act rulemaking, as it is the first substantive proposed rule that addresses core requirements for stablecoin issuers. It covers requirements for issuance, which encompass capital, liquidity, risk management, permissible activities, and disclosure and reporting requirements. These requirements are, however, topics that other primary federal payment stablecoin regulators—namely, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration—will also be required to address in their respective parallel rulemakings for the payment stablecoin issuers they will be responsible for regulating and supervising. 

Commenting on the Proposal in isolation presents challenges to stakeholders, given the number of interrelated rulemakings required by the GENIUS Act—the vast majority of which have yet to be proposed. Moreover, Section 4(h)(2) of the GENIUS Act requires coordinated rulemaking across primary federal regulators related to standards for payment stablecoin issuance. While “coordination” can take various forms, coordinated final interagency rulemakings would meaningfully advance regulatory clarity.

Federal payment stablecoin regulators should consider—as federal regulators have done with other complex rulemakings—publishing a rulemaking schedule that contemplates the order in which coordinated issuance of GENIUS Act rulemakings would be proposed and finalized. This process would align comment periods across interrelated rulemakings, enabling stakeholders to provide useful and focused comments, and furthering Congress’s explicit call for “coordination” in the GENIUS Act.

2. The Proposal implements key aspects of the GENIUS Act but leaves open significant policy questions for stakeholders. For example, while certain aspects of the Proposal’s rebuttable presumption on payment of interest or yield appear consistent with the GENIUS Act, other aspects may exceed the OCC’s rulemaking authority, prompting procedural challenges.

The Proposal’s attempt to resolve the broader impasse on stablecoin rewards is likely to draw challenges by various stakeholders. On the one hand, the Proposal seeks to define the parameters around evasion of GENIUS’s prohibition, which is supported by Section 4(h)(1) of the GENIUS Act.[1] One potential concern, however, is that the Proposal’s rebuttable presumption seeks to not only cover issuers, but also third parties who have contractual arrangements with issuers—i.e., entities that are neither explicitly addressed for this purpose in the GENIUS Act, and who may fall outside the OCC’s regulatory or enforcement authority. If finalized in current form, impacted stakeholders may argue, among other things, that Congress’s delegation of authority in Section 4(h)(1) does not extend to the parties outside of the issuers, and therefore that this aspect of the Proposal exceeds the OCC’s statutory authority.

If enacted, the CLARITY Act could supersede the OCC’s attempt to resolve the stablecoin rewards question.

3. A helpful roadmap: Next steps for issuers who seek OCC licensure

The GENIUS Act becomes effective on the earlier of 18 months after enactment (January 18, 2027) or 120 days after the primary regulators issue final implementing rules. This is a fairly compressed timeline for both regulators and applicants.

Subpart D of the Proposal provides a helpful licensing roadmap. It outlines a proposed framework for the application and approval processes, along with various proposed review criteria. It is anticipated that the OCC (and potentially other federal payment stablecoin regulators) may begin accepting applications in the window between the issuance of final rules and the GENIUS Act effective date (which could occur January 18, 2027, at the latest).

Issuers are advised to plan well in advance given the breadth of the OCC’s proposed application review criteria, which includes assessing financial conditions and resources; the background of the officers, directors, or shareholders; the applicant’s redemption policy; and the applicant’s ability to comply with the various provisions in Subpart B (described below).

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Scope

The Proposal would set forth a regulatory framework for certain entities that fall within the scope of the OCC’s asserted jurisdiction, including the following.

• Permitted payment stablecoin issuers (PPSIs):
• Within the OCC’s jurisdiction, this group covers subsidiaries of insured depository institutions (IDIs), subsidiaries of federal savings associations, uninsured national banks, federal branches or subsidiaries, nonbank entities that seek to be federally regulated, and state regulated nonbank entities that the OCC has regulatory and enforcement authority over in “unusual and exigent circumstances.”
• Foreign payment stablecoin issuers (FPSIs):
• This group comprises issuers that are organized under the laws of, or are domiciled in, a foreign country or a territory of the United States.
• Businesses providing custodial or safekeeping services for the payment stablecoin reserve, the payment stablecoins used as collateral, or the private keys used to issue permitted payment stablecoins (“Covered Custodians”):
• This group covers national banks, federal savings associations, and federal and state regulated stablecoin issuers with an outstanding issuance of more than $10 billion who provide custody or safekeeping services for “covered assets” (discussed below).

While the Proposal does not cover digital asset service providers (DASPs)—e.g., cryptocurrency exchanges or digital asset custodians—in depth,[2] as discussed below, the Proposal’s analysis of the GENIUS Act’s prohibition of payment of yield or interest by issuers could have significant impacts on DASPs, including cryptocurrency exchanges, as well as PPSIs and FPSIs, if finalized in current form.

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Requirements

The Proposal would implement the GENIUS Act and expand the statutory requirements in various ways, providing policy, technical, and procedural details in these areas:

• Subpart B: Permitted (and prohibited) activities of a stablecoin issuer
• Reserve assets
• Redemption
• Risk management
• Audits, reports, and supervision
• State qualified payment stablecoin issuers
• Unusual and exigent circumstances
• Subpart C: Custody
• Subpart D: Applications and Registrations
• Subpart E: Capital and Operational Backstop

Subpart B: Permitted (and prohibited) activities of a stablecoin issuer (§ 15.10)

The Proposal mirrors permitted activities described in the GENIUS Act and provides that a PPSI may undertake any other activities that directly support any of these activities including the issuer’s holding of non-payment stablecoin as principal necessary for testing a distributed ledger. PPSIs would also be permitted to assess fees that are associated with the purchasing or redeeming of payment stablecoins, and would be allowed to hold and transact in payment stablecoins as principal or agent (e.g., acting as an agent for a customer with respect to the redemption of a payment stablecoin issued by a third party).

Prohibited Activities.

Proposal §§ 15.10(c)(4) and 15.31(c)(4) provide, in part, that PPSIs and FPSIs would be prohibited from paying the holder of any payment stablecoin any form of interest or yield (whether in cash, tokens, or other consideration) solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention of such payment stablecoin. While this concept is consistent with the GENIUS Act’s prohibition on issuers, the Proposal would go further to extend this prohibition to the activities of third-party platforms, even though the GENIUS Act does not impose this prohibition beyond issuers.

The Proposal’s preamble expands on the GENIUS Act’s prohibition, thereby wading into the ongoing (and highly contentious) dispute dividing the banking industry and various crypto companies in connection with multiple congressional attempts to pass the CLARITY Act, focused on digital assets market infrastructure:

The OCC understands that issuers could attempt to make prohibited payments of interest or yield to payment stablecoins holders through arrangements with third parties. Moreover, there likely will be a large and changing variety of arrangements with third parties in which issuers could achieve the payment of yield to payment stablecoin holders. It would not be possible to identify in detail all, or even most, of the potential arrangements between [PPSIs] and third parties that the OCC may prohibit under [ . . . ] the GENIUS Act and the OCC’s rulemaking authority under [ . . . ] the GENIUS Act, particularly as such arrangements may evolve over time. On the other hand, a rule with only a general prohibition on the payment of yield could create uncertainty within the payment stablecoin market.[3]

In seeking to address this broader industry concern, the Proposal incorporates the GENIUS Act’s prohibition on payment of interest or yield by an issuer and proposes a rebuttable presumption that presumes a PPSI or FPSI would be violating that prohibition if:

• The issuer has a contract, agreement, or other arrangement with an affiliate of the issuer or related third party (“related third party” is defined as a person (i) that offers to pay interest or yield to holders as a service and (ii) for which the PPSI issues payment stablecoins under a white-label relationship) (“Related Parties”) to pay interest or yield to the affiliate or related third party; and

• The issuer’s affiliate, related third party, or an affiliate of the related third party has a contract, agreement, or other arrangement to pay interest or yield to a holder of any payment stablecoin issued by the issuer solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention of such payment stablecoin.

An issuer would be permitted to rebut this presumption by “submitting written materials that, in the OCC’s judgment, demonstrate that the contract, agreement, or other arrangement is not prohibited” and “not an attempt to evade the prohibition.” The Proposal notes that there could be other arrangements not captured by this presumption that may also violate the GENIUS statutory prohibition “or constitute an evasion thereof.” The OCC would assess those arrangements on a case-by-case basis.

The Proposal carves out certain situations—i.e., it “is not intended to prevent a merchant from independently offering a discount to a payment stablecoin holder for using payment stablecoins,” or prevent a PPSI from sharing in the profits derived from the payment stablecoin with a non-affiliate partner in a white-label arrangement.

Subpart B: Reserve Assets (§ 15.11)

The Proposal defines “reserve asset” to align with the GENIUS Act and confirms that a PPSI may maintain reserve assets as a custodian or within the custody of an “eligible financial institution.” A PPSI would be required to segregate customer assets from other assets of the PPSI, and at all times maintain reserves that have a total fair value that equals or exceeds the outstanding issuance value of the PPSI.

The PPSI would be limited to one withdrawal per month of surplus assets, but only if the required month-end composition report is certified and the withdrawal would not cause the value of reserve assets to fall below the current outstanding issuance value. Additionally, any PPSI with an outstanding issuance value of at least $25 billion would need to keep at least 0.5% of reserve assets as insured deposits or shares at an insured depository institution.

Asset Diversification and Concentration. The Proposal describes two alternative options to address reserve asset diversification, including deposit concentration and risk management standards. For either model the OCC expects that all PPSIs will need to maintain multiple reserve asset types.

• Option A includes a principles-based general requirement with an optional safe harbor (containing quantitative requirements). Generally, a PPSI would be required to maintain reserve assets that are “sufficiently diverse to manage potential credit, liquidity, interest rate, and price risks.” This approach would involve measuring and managing the risk that concentrating reserve assets at one or a small number of eligible financial institutions may impair the ability of a PPSI to satisfy redemption demands.
• Among other quantitative requirements, a PPSI would be required to maintain at least 10 percent of its reserve deposits as deposits or insured shares or money standing to the credit of an account with a Federal Reserve Bank.
• Option B would make Option A’s quantitative requirements mandatory for all issuers and would not provide an optional safe harbor.

Subpart B: Redemption (§ 15.12)

Consistent with the GENIUS Act, PPSIs would be required to publish their redemption policy, including “clear and conspicuous procedures” for timely redemption of outstanding stablecoins that “may not exceed two business days” following the requested redemption. Any discretionary limitations on timely redemptions could only be imposed by the OCC, Federal Reserve, or applicable state payment stablecoin regulator, and under specified conditions (e.g., redemption demands in excess of 10 percent of outstanding issuance value). All fees associated with purchase and redemption would also need to be publicly and clearly disclosed.

Subpart B: Risk Management (§ 15.13)

The Proposal would adopt a principles-based approach to a wide range of risk management requirements. PPSIs would be required to maintain operational and managerial standards appropriate to their size, complexity, and risk profile, including the implementation of BSA/AML and sanctions compliance standards, which will be addressed in a separate proposed rule.

PPSIs would be required to have, among other things, robust internal controls and information systems, clear segregation of duties, defined lines of authority, effective risk assessment processes, timely and accurate financial and regulatory reporting, and procedures to safeguard and manage assets including reserve assets. In addition, PPSIs would be required to implement an internal audit system proportionate to their operations, either through a formal internal audit function or independent reviews of key controls, with documented testing, verification of reserve calculations and regulatory filings, independent oversight, and board or audit committee review of audit effectiveness.

The Proposal would also require PPSIs to manage interest rate risk in a manner commensurate with their risk exposure, consistent with the prudentially supervised entities subject to safety and soundness expectations.

Taken together, the risk management framework closely mirrors bank supervisory standards, emphasizing internal controls, audit independence, reserve verification, governance oversight, and active board involvement. PPSIs would have ongoing compliance, reporting, and governance obligations, and could be subject to enforcement actions under federal statutes if they fail to meet risk management expectations, consistent with the OCC’s statutory authority.

Subpart B: Audits, Reports, and Supervision (§ 15.14)

The OCC would examine each PPSI under its supervision at least once every 12 months, with authority to extend the cycle to 18 to 36 months for smaller, compliant issuers below specified issuance and trading thresholds and not subject to enforcement actions. PPSIs would be required to grant access to records and documents of any type and develop a compliant records retention policy. PPSIs would also be required to submit a weekly confidential report and a quarterly financial condition report to the OCC.

The Proposal would also impose robust ongoing reporting and governance obligations. PPSIs would have to submit confidential weekly reports, quarterly financial condition reports with CFO certification and board attestation, and additional reports upon request covering financial condition, risk controls, BSA compliance, and sanctions compliance. Boards would need to certify within 180 days of approval and annually thereafter that anti-money laundering and sanctions programs are reasonably designed and effective.

Larger issuers—those exceeding $50 billion in outstanding issuance and not otherwise subject to SEC reporting—would need to prepare GAAP financial statements audited by a PCAOB-registered firm, publicly post the audited statements, and file them with the OCC. The Proposal would also apply change-in-control standards comparable to those for national banks.

Subpart B: State Qualified Payment Stablecoin Issuers (§ 15.15)

When a state qualified payment stablecoin issuer (SQPSI) reaches an outstanding issuance value of more than $10 billion, the GENIUS Act would require the SQPSI to transition to federal regulatory authority within 360 days or stop issuing new payment stablecoins until the SQPSI is under this $10 billion threshold. Within five days of meeting the $10 billion threshold, the SQPSI would be required to submit a notice to the OCC detailing state regulatory information, outstanding issuance value, and the date it reached the $10 billion threshold.

Within 270 days of reaching the $10 billion threshold, an SQPSI would be required to submit an analysis of capital and expected capital needs for the OCC to determine a minimum capital requirement. An SQPSI that exceeds the $10 billion threshold may obtain a waiver from the OCC, which would allow the OCC, in its discretion, to permit continued state supervision above the threshold if certain waiver criteria are satisfied (e.g., the SQPSI maintains sufficient capital and the state’s regulatory framework has been certified as “substantially similar” according to the relevant provisions in the GENIUS Act).

Subpart B: Unusual and exigent circumstances (§ 15.16)

As authorized in the GENIUS Act, the OCC may take enforcement action (in the form of a directive) against any SQPSI that is a nonbank entity should it determine that “unusual and exigent circumstances” exist.[4] The GENIUS Act further authorizes the OCC to issue criteria for determining the unusual and exigent circumstances under which it would act.[5]

Under such circumstances, if the OCC determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the continuation of any activity by such SQPSI constitutes a serious risk to that institution’s financial safety, soundness, or stability, the OCC is statutorily obligated to impose appropriate restrictions that address the risk so long as unusual and exigent circumstances continue to exist. These may include (but would not be limited to) limitations on redemption, transactions between the SQPSI and its affiliates, or other activities. The Proposal clarifies that the OCC would not only consider continuation of activity that may pose a serious risk to an SQPSI’s stability, but also an SQPIS’s failure to act appropriately.

The Proposal sets forth criteria for determining whether unusual and exigent circumstances exist, namely:

1. whether the SQPSI is engaging or expected to “imminently” engage in an activity or omission that poses an immediate risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability of the SQPSI or the U.S. financial system as a whole,
2. the actions of the relevant state payment stablecoin regulator in response to such risk,
3. the risks faced by holders of payment stablecoins, and
4. any additional factors that the OCC deems appropriate as consistent with the purposes of the GENIUS Act.

The proposed criteria are intended to address scenarios where ordinary supervision is insufficient. The criteria are flexible and intended to establish an appropriate balance between clarifying the OCC’s criteria while preserving its ability to respond in an appropriate manner to evolving or unforeseen circumstances.

The Proposal would also apply the administrative review procedures described in § 7(e)(2)(D) to an SQPSI or any institution-affiliated party subject to an unusual and exigent circumstances directive.

Subpart C: Custody (§§ 15.20-15.23)

Subpart C imposes requirements on Covered Custodians.[6] The Proposal would, among other things, define key terms that clarify the application of Subpart C and establish principles-based minimum requirements for OCC-supervised institutions engaged in custodial or safekeeping services. It also clarifies the scope of certain exemptions to the rules governing Covered Custodians as well as the scope of activities addressed by this subpart.

Among other proposed definitional changes, the OCC would include cash and other property in the definition of “covered assets,” which would extend Covered Custodians’ fiduciary obligations to non-stablecoin assets related to the provision of custodial services for payment stablecoin reserves or collateralized payment stablecoins. The OCC would also define “digital wallet” as any software program or hardware device that stores and manages the private keys associated with a particular unit of a digital asset.

Furthermore, the Proposal would clarify that an insured national bank or federal savings association providing custodial or safekeeping services for covered assets may hold covered assets in the form of cash on deposit in a manner that is consistent with federal law. The Proposal would also elaborate on the exception in the GENIUS Act that allows Covered Custodians to withdraw and apply a portion of a covered customer’s covered assets as necessary to account for certain expenses relating to the covered customer’s use of the services, such as taxes, storage, or commissions.[7] The OCC would require that any such withdrawals be in compliance with applicable law and the written custodial agreement, and that any withdrawal from an omnibus account be properly recorded so as not to endanger the assets of any other covered customer.

The Proposal would also implement minimum principles-based requirements applicable to Covered Custodians’ treatment of covered assets. For instance, a Covered Custodian must:

• Separately account for the covered assets of each covered customer and treat them separately from the Covered Custodian’s own property;[8]
• Take appropriate steps to protect the covered assets from the claims of creditors by implementing written policies, procedures, and controls commensurate to the Covered Custodian’s size, complexity, risk profile, and the nature of the applicable covered assets; and
• Maintain control over covered assets that are held directly, including in a digital wallet for which it controls the associated private keys. Any Covered Custodian, or sub-custodian, as applicable, maintains control for the purpose of this requirement if it can reasonably demonstrate that no other party, including the covered customer, may transfer the payment stablecoin or tokenized asset using a distributed ledger without the custodian’s consent.

Finally, the OCC is considering whether to implement additional reporting requirements. For Covered Custodians that are national banks, federal savings associations, or federal branches, the OCC would rely on the reporting that such institutions already provide pursuant to Schedule RC-T of their call report. For non-bank federal qualified payment stablecoin issuers and SQPSIs with an outstanding issuance value of more than $10 billion, the OCC would propose to rely on their reporting pursuant to the quarterly report on financial condition. In addition to such reporting, the OCC is considering requiring additional reporting concerning: (1) total covered assets under custody and (2) total payment stablecoin reserves under custody.

Subpart D: Application and Registrations (§§ 15.30-15.33)

Subpart D covers approval processes for PPSIs (within the OCC’s jurisdiction) and FPSIs, registration of FPSIs, and revocation or recission of approval.

PPSIs would be required to submit an application on the OCC’s website, which would include the Interagency Biographical and Financial Report for officers. Thirty days after receipt of the application, the OCC would be required to notify applicants regarding whether their application is “substantially complete.” If the OCC determines an application is “substantially complete,” the application is deemed approved as of the 120th day after receipt, unless denied by the OCC with a written explanation, including all findings. 

When evaluating a substantially complete application, the OCC would consider various review factors, including financial conditions and resources, the background of the officers, directors, or shareholders; the applicant’s redemption policy; and the applicant’s ability to comply with Subpart B.

To avoid the prohibitions of section 3 of the GENIUS Act, FPSIs would need to be subject to supervision by a foreign payment stablecoin regulator with a regime similar to the provisions in the GENIUS Act, registered with the OCC, and that holds reserves in U.S. financial institutions sufficient for the needs of U.S. customers. Additionally, foreign regulators must not be subject to economic sanctions or deemed as being in a jurisdiction with primary money laundering concerns.

To register with the OCC as a FPSI, the organization must: file an application that includes evidence that the Treasury Secretary has determined that the structure of the foreign regulatory regime is comparable to GENIUS Act requirements; consent to U.S. jurisdiction relating to GENIUS Act enforcement; and provide a certification that it will make available any information that the OCC requests access to that will be necessary for GENIUS Act compliance.

Subpart E: Capital and Operational Backstop (§§ 15.40-15.42)

Subpart E of the Proposal would implement the GENIUS Act requirement to establish capital requirements for PPSIs. The statute requires, among other things, that capital requirements must be tailored to the business model and risk profile of the PPSI, and must not exceed what is sufficient to ensure ongoing operations of the PPSI.

The Proposal reflects this statutory mandate by proposing a capital regime for PPSIs focused principally on operational risk. Importantly, the Proposal recognizes that the risks that traditional bank regulatory capital is intended to address (e.g., credit, market, interest rate risks) are either minimal for PPSIs or may be addressed elsewhere in the Proposal (e.g., reserve asset liquidity/diversification).

As proposed, Subpart E would contain the following three primary provisions:

1. Capital elements (§ 15.40). Proposed § 15.40 provides for two capital elements: common equity tier 1 capital and additional tier 1 capital. The composition of these two capital elements is generally consistent with the capital elements for national banks under the existing OCC regulations which, according to the OCC, is intended to create parity for capital treatment, including among bank subsidiaries that plan to offer stablecoins and non-bank-affiliated PPSIs.
   
   As it relates to this provision, the OCC is seeking comments on whether other capital elements should be permitted (e.g., Tier 2 capital such as subordinated debt), or whether other approaches should be considered (e.g., a simpler GAAP-based equity standard). The OCC is also seeking input on whether to require certain deductions (e.g., for goodwill and other intangible assets). 
2. Minimum capital and backstop (§ 15.41). Proposed § 15.41 sets forth the OCC’s proposed minimum capital and operational backstop requirements. These requirements would focus on operational risk because, according to the OCC, PPSIs are typically not engaged in lending, and credit and market risk are largely addressed elsewhere in the Proposal. 
   
   Rather than proposing a one-size-fits-all capital formula, the OCC proposes case-by-case evaluation capital that is calibrated to the PPSI’s size, complexity, risk profile, and operational infrastructure. This tailored approach parallels the OCC’s minimum capital requirements for chartering national trust banks. At a minimum, the OCC proposes to require a $5 million minimum capital requirement for de novo PPSIs. Subpart E would also include an operational backstop, designed to ensure that PPSIs maintain capital sufficient to continue operating during stress.
   
   As it relates to Proposal § 15.41, the OCC has requested comments on whether (i) the minimum capital and backstop structure are appropriate; (ii) adjustments should be made for newly acquired or divested businesses; and (iii) total expenses should be modified for backstop calculation purposes.
3. Individual additional capital or backstop requirement (§ 15.42). Proposal § 15.42 would also authorize the OCC to impose individual additional capital or backstop requirements. This authority would provide flexibility for the OCC to respond to emerging risks, given the evolving nature of stablecoin business models. The Proposal includes an illustrative list of examples when the OCC may consider imposing an individual additional capital or backstop requirement (e.g., when a stablecoin is facing a significant increase in operational risks or excessive volatility in issuance or redemptions).

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We will continue to monitor all GENIUS Act regulatory developments, including the Proposal. Given the Proposal’s breadth, we urge stakeholders to consider commenting on the Proposal, especially given its potential impacts and the possibility that it could form the basis for other related rulemakings. Contact our team if you have any additional questions, and subscribe to MoFo’s Stablecoins Resource Center to receive more up-to-date information on Stablecoins.

[1] Section 4(h)(1) of the GENIUS Act states that the primary federal payments stablecoin regulators “shall . . . issue such regulations . . . as may be necessary . . . to administer and carry out the requirements of this section . . . including to establish conditions, and to prevent evasion thereof.”

[2] Footnote 12 of the Proposal notes, consistent with the GENIUS Act, that the prohibition against DASPs offering or selling payment stablecoins that are not issued by PPSIs begins on July 18, 2028. The Proposal clarifies that the prohibition against DASPs offering or selling payment stablecoins that are not issued by FPSIs that meet certain requirements goes into effect as of the effective date of the GENIUS Act, which may not occur until January 18, 2027 (internal citations omitted).

[3] Implementing the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act for the Issuance of Stablecoins by Entities Subject to the Jurisdiction of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 91 Fed. Reg. 101202, 10212 (Mar. 2, 2026).

[4] 12 U.S.C. § 5906(e)(2)(A).

[5] 12 U.S.C. § 5906(e)(2)(B).

[6] 12 U.S.C. § 5909.

[7] 12 U.S.C. § 5909(c)(2)(B).

[8] Note, however, that the Proposal would also allow any Covered Custodian to commingle the covered assets of multiple covered customers in one or more omnibus accounts to the extent it has taken adequate steps to maintain safe and sound practices in accordance with applicable law.