SEC Proposes Executive and Director Compensation Disclosure Reforms
On November 13, 2026, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed sweeping revisions to the executive and director compensation disclosure requirements in Item 402 of Regulation S-K (the “Proposal”). The Proposal would focus executive pay disclosure primarily on a company’s principal executive officer (“PEO”) and principal financial officer (“PFO”), reduce the required compensation tables, and streamline several current disclosures.
Read the SEC’s release. The comment period will close 60 days after publication of the Proposal in the Federal Register.
The proposed effective date would be January 1 following publication of an adopting release in the Federal Register, with mandatory compliance beginning with the first full fiscal year ending on or after that date and earlier compliance permitted. For example, if an adopting release were published in 2027, calendar-year companies would first be permitted to use the new rules in their 2028 proxy statements and first required to use the new rules in their 2029 proxy statements.
Notably, as is the case with many of the SEC’s recently proposed rules, the Proposal is not a final rule, and the SEC is accepting public comments. Existing disclosure requirements remain in effect. Companies should continue preparing their 2027 proxy statements under the current rules while considering how the Proposal could affect future disclosure and investor engagement.
Background: How We Got Here
Executive compensation disclosure has been an integral part of the federal securities regime since the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933, but the current framework is largely the product of SEC rulemaking in 1992 and 2006, when disclosure requirements were significantly overhauled.
Since then, incremental requirements have been added to the regime as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, including say-on-pay and golden parachute disclosure, CEO pay ratio disclosure, and pay-versus-performance and clawback disclosures. In his statement on the Proposal, SEC Chair Paul Atkins noted that Item 402 has become “bloated—reaching nearly the end of the alphabet in its internal organizational system.”
Indeed, complaints about executive compensation disclosure are common. In June 2025, the SEC held a roundtable and received over 70 comment letters. Companies and their advisors generally focused on the burden and complexity of these disclosures, while investors were more supportive of the current rules. Investors did, however, agree that the current disclosure is often repetitive, with many saying it is difficult to follow an equity award from grant to payout under the current tables. The Proposal aims to address many of these complaints.
What Would Change & the Impact
Adopting a Principles-Based Approach
The Proposal would replace much of Item 402’s existing structure with a more principles-based approach. Rather than requiring disclosure of “all plan and non-plan compensation,” the proposed rule’s objective would be to provide investors with “material information relevant to an assessment of the compensation” of the named executive officers (“NEOs”) and directors. Companies would also be required to disclose any material information necessary to understand the new compensation tables, in whatever format they choose.
Many prescriptive footnote requirements and lists of example topics also would be eliminated. However, material information from an eliminated table would still have to be disclosed. Companies would simply have more flexibility in how they present information, for example, by splitting a required column into multiple columns or adding a supplemental table, footnotes, or other narrative disclosures.
Practice Note: Much of the current Item 402 process is mechanical and prescriptive. Under the Proposal, companies would need to exercise greater judgment in determining what information is material, including miscellaneous compensation and differences between target and probable outcomes. Because of this shift, market practice may develop over many years and practices may ultimately differ across industries and among companies. The focus of SEC comments and liability risk may therefore shift from formatting issues to material omissions. If the Proposal is adopted as proposed, companies should establish procedures for the compensation committee, consultants, and disclosure counsel to make and document these judgments.
Fewer Named Executive Officers
Under current Item 402(a)(3), a company’s NEOs include:
- all individuals who served as PEO during the last completed fiscal year;
- all individuals who served as PFO during that year;
- the three most highly compensated executive officers other than the PEO and PFO who were serving as executive officers at fiscal year-end; and
- up to two additional individuals who would have been among those three had they still been serving as executive officers at year-end.
Under the Proposal, NEOs would be limited to the individuals who served as PEO or PFO during the last completed fiscal year, including interim and co-officers. Most companies would therefore have two NEOs, rather than five or more. The same definition would apply to smaller reporting companies (“SRCs”) and emerging growth companies (“EGCs”), which generally have three or more NEOs today.
Companies may voluntarily include other executives in the new tables, provided they complete all three tables in full for each executive voluntarily included and disclose any material information necessary to understand those disclosures. A company could not, for example, show only an executive’s granted compensation without providing the other required tabular information. Voluntarily disclosing other executives’ compensation would not make them NEOs or bring them within the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (“CD&A”), pay-versus-performance, or NEO‑based Form 8-K requirements.
Despite the proposed reduction in the number of NEOs, the Proposal notes that staff of the U.S. Department of the Treasury informally advised SEC staff that the Section 162(m) tax deduction limit will continue to apply to the three most highly compensated officers other than the PEO and PFO, whether or not their compensation is required to be disclosed. Companies would therefore still need to identify those officers and calculate their compensation for tax purposes. Because the Section 162(m) regulations identify those officers by reference to the SEC’s disclosure rules, eliminating the Summary Compensation Table would leave an open question as to which compensation measure to use.
Practice Note: A position-based NEO definition would reduce the need to assess how promotions, new-hire and retention awards, and departures affect which executives appear in the proxy statement. Reducing this annual turnover would also reduce disclosure changes driven solely by changes in which specific executives are covered in a given year and what specific compensation programs or arrangements those executives happen to participate in. Companies would no longer need to identify their three most highly compensated executive officers annually for disclosure purposes, although they would still need to do so for Section 162(m) purposes. Significant executive departures may also warrant announcements for business or Regulation FD reasons even where NEO-based Form 8-K reporting no longer applies.
Nonetheless, companies may ultimately retain some compensation disclosures that would no longer be technically required. Investors and proxy advisors may seek continued disclosure for a highly paid president, chief operating officer, or business unit head, or an executive viewed as a likely successor. In deciding what to disclose voluntarily, companies should balance investor information needs and proxy advisor expectations against the time and cost of preparing the disclosure and executives’ preferences regarding public disclosure of their compensation. Shareholder engagement will be critical to informing this assessment.
Only Three Compensation Tables
The Proposal would require three new tables: Earned Compensation Table, Granted Compensation Table, and Status of Equity Awards Table, replacing the current Summary Compensation Table, Grants of Plan-Based Awards Table, Outstanding Equity Awards at Fiscal Year-End Table, and Option Exercises and Stock Vested Table. The Pension Benefits Table and Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Table would also be eliminated.
The first two new tables would cover three fiscal years, or two fiscal years for SRCs and EGCs:
- Earned Compensation Table. This table would capture compensation earned in the covered fiscal year, aiming to include all material compensation, including salary, non‑equity awards, the value of vested stock awards, gains on exercised options, and other miscellaneous compensation. Miscellaneous compensation would include perquisites above the new threshold (see “Higher Perquisite Threshold and More Flexibility” below), tax gross-ups, contributions to defined contribution and nonqualified deferred compensation plans, above-market or preferential earnings on deferred compensation, the service cost of defined benefit pension plans (rather than the change in pension value), life insurance premiums, dividends on equity awards, and any other compensation the company determines is material. Companies would not be required to provide detailed footnotes identifying the components of miscellaneous compensation or to confirm that the column captures all compensation regardless of amount.
- Granted Compensation Table. This table would show amounts granted in the covered fiscal year, including annualized base salary, the target value of cash bonuses and other non-equity awards, and the grant-date fair value of equity awards. Equity award values would be calculated assuming target outcomes for any performance, market, or service conditions rather than probable outcomes, with supplemental disclosure where the difference is material. The SEC acknowledges that this may cause reported values to differ from those in the financial statements; supplemental disclosure may explain those differences. Companies may want to consider adding an Expected Award or Midpoint of Award column where large differences may occur. Companies could elect to report an equity award granted in the first fiscal quarter in the prior year’s column if they consider the award to be for performance in that prior year, provided the election is applied consistently and disclosed. A cash award earned in a year before it is granted, such as a discretionary bonus approved after year-end for performance in the prior year, would be reported as granted in the year in which it was earned.
- Status of Equity Awards Table. This table would require award-by-award disclosure of equity terms and progress through the life of the award, expressed in shares rather than annually revalued dollar amounts. The table would show the grant date, award type, number of shares (including threshold, target, and maximum amounts), end of the performance period, final vesting date, exercise price, and the amounts that have vested, been exercised, or expired. This table is intended to bridge the gap between the new Earned Compensation Table and Granted Compensation Table.
Large accelerated filers would have to tag the three tables in Inline XBRL, but the existing XBRL tagging requirements for pay-versus-performance and clawback disclosures would be eliminated.
Practice Note: Replacing the single Summary Compensation Table total, a widely used reference point for nearly 20 years, would represent a paradigm shift in presenting executive compensation. Companies should assess their data needs and consider explaining in the CD&A how the two totals relate, particularly when stock price fluctuations, the vesting of large multiyear awards, or option exercises cause significant differences. Proxy advisors, compensation consultants, and investors also may need to adjust their expectations and approaches. The move from probable to target values may change the reported value of performance awards and potentially influence how boards set performance goals. Companies should also carefully consider any election to attribute first-quarter equity grants to the prior year, given the requirement to apply the election consistently.
Higher Perquisite Threshold and More Flexibility
Perquisites (“perks”) and other personal benefits are currently reported in the “All other compensation” column of the Summary Compensation Table unless their aggregate value for an NEO is less than $10,000, a threshold that has not changed since 2006. Where the threshold is met, each perquisite must be identified by type in a footnote, and any individual perquisite valued at more than the greater of $25,000 or 10% of the NEO’s total perquisites must be separately quantified. Perquisites must be valued at their aggregate incremental cost to the company. Further, in determining what counts as a perquisite, companies apply a two-part test set out in the SEC’s 2006 interpretive guidance.
An item is not a perquisite if it is “integrally and directly related” to the performance of the executive’s duties, which the SEC has described as a “narrow” concept. Conversely, an item is a perquisite if it confers a direct or indirect personal benefit and is not generally available to all employees. The SEC’s 2006 guidance listed examples of items that are perquisites, including security provided at an executive’s personal residence or during personal travel, commuting expenses, and personal use of company aircraft and other property. Companies and their advisors have long described this analysis as subjective and difficult to apply, particularly as work arrangements and security needs have changed.
The Proposal would give companies greater deference in determining what must be disclosed by increasing the aggregate perquisite disclosure threshold from $10,000 to $150,000 per NEO, permitting companies to disregard de minimis fringe benefits in applying that threshold, and eliminating the requirement to value perquisites at their aggregate incremental cost to the company. Companies could instead use, for example, values already determined for tax purposes, reducing the administrative burden of disclosure.
More generally, companies would be afforded greater flexibility to determine, reasonably and in good faith, that a benefit is integrally and directly related to the performance of the executive’s duties and, therefore, is not a perquisite. Along these lines, the SEC would rescind its 2006 list of examples, which treated personal security and security-driven personal use of company aircraft as perquisites. Under the Proposal, if a company reasonably concludes in good faith that such items are integrally and directly related to the executive’s duties, they would not be perquisites for disclosure purposes. Greater flexibility would thus be accompanied by greater reliance on company-specific judgments, particularly for security programs and personal aircraft use.
Practice Note: Boards, in consultation with counsel and other advisors, should begin thinking about current perquisite policies in light of the Proposal. The higher threshold could remove many perquisites from required disclosure; even above the threshold, perquisites would be included in the Miscellaneous Compensation Received total without the current requirement to identify and quantify significant components in footnotes. Greater deference to reasonable, good-faith company determinations would make classification more judgment-based, but those judgments could still be second-guessed.
Although the release directs companies to the revised guidance rather than prior enforcement proceedings, perquisites have historically attracted SEC enforcement attention, and interpretive guidance can change with the Commission’s composition. Companies should therefore consider a written framework, compensation committee review, and documentation of the business rationale for their determinations, particularly for security programs and personal use of private jets. Investor expectations also warrant consideration: some investors and proxy advisors may continue to view security and aircraft costs as material aspects of compensation and request their disclosure. Disclosure could also help compensation committees resist excessive requests. Accordingly, companies may choose to continue disclosing these costs voluntarily.
Shorter CD&A, but New Non-GAAP Requirements
Item 402 currently requires companies to address seven topics in the CD&A. The rule also includes a non-exhaustive list of 15 example topics that may be material, such as policies for allocating between cash and non-cash compensation, the use of benchmarking, the role of executive officers in setting compensation, and the impact of accounting and tax treatment. Although the CD&A was intended to be principles-based, it has grown to an average of roughly 10,000 words.
Under the Proposal, the CD&A would be required to address only three topics:
- The objectives of the company’s compensation program in relation to its corporate strategy;
- The material elements of compensation and how those amounts are determined; and
- If applicable, whether and how the company considered the results of its most recent say-on-pay vote.
This is perhaps the clearest example of the Proposal’s shift from prescriptive to principles-based disclosure. SRCs and EGCs would continue to be exempt from the CD&A requirement.
Nonetheless, the Proposal would also require companies to disclose their non-GAAP targets or company-selected financial performance measures. Measures based on historical results would require a quantitative reconciliation to the most directly comparable GAAP measure, which could be incorporated by reference from another filing. For all non-GAAP targets and company-selected measures, companies would also need to explain why they believe the non-GAAP measure is more appropriate than a GAAP measure for determining compensation or for showing the relationship between pay and performance. Targets based on projections would continue to require a description of how the measure is calculated from the audited financial statements, as under the current rules. These disclosures would continue to be exempt from Regulation G and Item 10(e).
Practice Note: The Proposal should allow companies to shorten their CD&A, but changes may be gradual. Some companies, particularly newly public ones preparing CD&A for the first time, may readily embrace the new approach; others may retain prior descriptions of incentive programs to maintain consistency and help ensure that all material information is disclosed. Nonetheless, peer group benchmarking, the use of discretion, and responses to shareholder feedback often reflect investor and proxy advisor expectations and say-on-pay results rather than the SEC’s example topics, so eliminating those topics may not substantially reduce disclosure in practice.
Companies should also consider how to articulate the relationship between compensation program objectives and corporate strategy, which may require more thought than under the current requirement. For companies using adjusted metrics, the new reconciliation requirement would add a burden whenever actual results are reported against a non-GAAP target, even as other requirements are eliminated. Compensation committees should be prepared to explain why an adjusted measure is more appropriate than GAAP and the rationale for each adjustment, as these explanations are likely to attract investor and proxy advisor attention.
Revised Pay-Versus-Performance and Pay Ratio Disclosures
Pay-Versus-Performance Disclosures
The SEC adopted the current pay-versus-performance rule to implement Section 953(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires disclosure of the relationship between “executive compensation actually paid” and the company’s financial performance. The current rule requires a table covering five years (three for SRCs; EGCs are exempt from this disclosure). For the PEO, and on average for the other NEOs, the table shows both the Summary Compensation Table total and a separate measure of “compensation actually paid.”
Under the Proposal, pay-versus-performance disclosures would tie to the Earned Compensation Table total instead of the “compensation actually paid” measure, eliminating the complex calculations used to derive that measure. The SEC believes this better reflects compensation “actually paid” under the Dodd-Frank Act because it captures amounts the executive has actually received rather than changes in the value of unvested awards. Other changes would include:
- Requiring company total shareholder return (“TSR”) as the only performance measure, eliminating net income and peer group TSR, and making the company-selected measure optional;
- Eliminating the tabular list of three to seven performance measures;
- Covering only the PEO and PFO, rather than the PEO and the average of the other NEOs; and
- Reducing the disclosure period from five years to three.
Because earned compensation includes values at vesting or exercise, reported pay could spike when stock awards vest or options are exercised, even if they relate to performance over several years. However, the new Status of Equity Awards Table and any voluntary disclosure could provide context.
Practice Note: The Proposal would eliminate one of the most complex calculations in the proxy statement, although some investors and consultants view the existing “compensation actually paid” measure as providing meaningful information unavailable elsewhere. Because the new measure would not be comparable to prior years’ disclosure, companies should initially consider accompanying their pay-versus-performance disclosure with a narrative explaining the differences between the prior “compensation actually paid” measure and the Earned Compensation Table total. The narrative could also explain how the vesting of prior-year awards and option exercises affect current-year compensation, particularly when a large award granted in a prior year vests or is exercised during the reporting period.
Pay Ratio Disclosures
The pay ratio rule, adopted in 2015 to implement Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, requires companies to disclose the ratio of the PEO’s annual total compensation to that of the company’s median employee, with both amounts calculated using the Summary Compensation Table methodology. Currently, the median employee is identified from all employees of the company and its consolidated subsidiaries, including full-time, part-time, seasonal, and temporary workers, whether located in the United States or abroad. Companies may exclude non-U.S. employees only in limited circumstances.
Under the Proposal, the median employee would be selected only from full-time employees in the United States and its territories, excluding temporary and seasonal workers, and generally identified once every five years rather than three. The Proposal makes no distinction for companies with sizable non-U.S. workforces. However, the SEC staff notes that an alternative to the blanket exclusion of non-U.S. employees could be to include them while allowing companies to adjust for wage variations across countries. Such adjustments could increase the comparability of those companies’ pay ratios with those of companies that meet similar labor needs using primarily U.S. employees.
Total compensation for both the PEO and the median employee would be calculated using the Granted Compensation Table, which does not include miscellaneous items such as perquisites, security costs, and retirement benefits. The data privacy and de minimis exemptions for non-U.S. employees, along with most of the detailed instructions and methodology disclosure, would be eliminated.
Practice Note: Limiting the employee population to U.S. full-time employees is likely to increase median employee pay at many companies, particularly those with large non-U.S., part-time, or seasonal workforces, while excluding miscellaneous compensation would reduce the PEO’s total. These changes could materially lower reported pay ratios. Companies should therefore be prepared to explain the extent to which changes in their ratios reflect the proposed methodology rather than pay decisions.
Other Notable Changes
Clawbacks
The two clawback-related check boxes on annual-report cover pages of Forms 10-K, 20-F, and 40‑F and certain related disclosures would be eliminated. The Proposal would also eliminate the requirement to explain why recovery was not required after a restatement, and the requirement to break out by executive any amounts that were impracticable to recover. Disclosure of actual recovery actions would remain. The SEC noted that Rule 10D-1 and the related listing standards are outside the scope of the Proposal.
Practice Note: Companies should continue performing and documenting recovery analyses, including for “little r” restatements.
Termination and Change in Control
Companies would describe material arrangements rather than quantify hypothetical termination and change-in-control payments. A company could omit this disclosure if it has already satisfied the requirement in a Form 8-K filed under Item 5.02, although other rules may still require disclosure (e.g., Item 10 of Schedule 14A).
Golden parachute disclosure would cover only the PEO and PFO, and the table would be reduced from eight columns to four (cash, equity, miscellaneous, and total). Accompanying footnote disclosures would no longer be required; instead, disclosure would rely on principles-based narrative.
Practice Note: Eliminating the requirement to quantify hypothetical termination and change-in-control payments could reduce the burden of preparing these disclosures, which can be significant. Investors and proxy advisory firms may nevertheless continue to seek quantified amounts to assess potential payouts and evaluate compensation arrangements. Companies should therefore consider shareholder and proxy advisor expectations when deciding whether to retain voluntary quantification, while remaining mindful of any disclosure requirements that continue to apply under other rules.
Director Compensation
The Director Compensation Table would be eliminated, although companies would still have to quantify each director’s retainers, cash, equity, and other material compensation in any format. Director equity would be valued when it vests or is exercised rather than at grant date fair value, consistent with the Earned Compensation Table. Companies would also disclose each director’s outstanding equity awards and their material terms. Pension and deferred compensation would no longer be specifically required. Where a director also serves as PEO or PFO, any compensation for board service would be reported only in the director compensation disclosure.
Practice Note: Valuing equity when it vests or is exercised could make director pay appear uneven from year to year. Proxy advisors that evaluate director pay levels may continue to look for grant-date values, and some companies may choose to provide both. Companies should also keep in mind that director compensation limits in equity plans are typically measured by grant date fair value.
Compensation Risk and Option Timing
The specific disclosures under Items 402(s) and 402(x) related to compensation risk and option timing would be removed.
Practice Note: This would not eliminate disclosure of material compensation-related risks, which the SEC expects risk factor and MD&A disclosure to capture. This would also not eliminate disclosure of material option spring-loading or bullet-dodging, which would be required to the extent necessary to understand the disclosure in the new tables.
Registration Statements
Long-form registration statements, such as Forms S-1, S-4, S-11, and 10, would receive additional flexibility on when the most recent year’s compensation disclosure must be included, generally until the later of its inclusion in an Exchange Act filing or 120 days after year-end. Item 5.02(f) of Form 8-K, which requires later reporting of salary and bonus amounts that could not be calculated at the time of the proxy statement, would be eliminated.
Practice Note: The proposed timing for compensation disclosures in long-form registration statements is the same as that available today to companies using short-form registration statements. Companies may find the additional flexibility helpful if a long-form registration statement must be filed early in the year.
Scaled Disclosure
SRCs and EGCs would retain CD&A and pay-ratio disclosure exemptions. Similarly, EGCs would remain exempt from pay-versus-performance and golden parachute disclosures. However, SRCs and EGCs would, for the first time, need to cover the PFO and provide the Granted Compensation Table and the Status of Equity Awards Table, which could increase the burden at some smaller companies compared to current requirements.
Consequences for Other Rules and Reporting Requirements
The Proposal would also have consequences for certain other rules and reporting requirements, as discussed below.
Form 8-K Item 5.02
Item 5.02(b) of Form 8-K requires disclosure whenever an NEO (among other named officers) retires, resigns, or is terminated from the applicable position. Additionally, Item 5.02(e) requires disclosure whenever a company enters into, adopts, or otherwise commences a material compensation plan, contract, or arrangement with an NEO (or the PEO or the PFO).
With the changes to the scope of NEOs in the Proposal, the reporting obligations in Item 5.02(b) and Item 5.02(e) would narrow. Item 5.02(e) would effectively apply only to the PEO and PFO, and Item 5.02(b) would apply only to them and the other officers it specifically names (the president, principal accounting officer, and principal operating officer).
Practice Note: Because Item 5.02 identifies NEOs by reference to the company’s most recent filing containing Item 402 disclosure, the narrower scope would apply once the company has filed under the new rules. Companies should consider Regulation FD requirements for other significant non‑NEO executive officers.
Item 403 of Regulation S-K
Item 403(b) of Regulation S-K (“Item 403(b)”) requires a company to furnish in its proxy statement the beneficial ownership of NEOs (and directors and nominees) of each class of the company’s securities. Item 403(b) also requires disclosure of the beneficial ownership of its securities by all directors and executive officers as a group.
Practice Note: As a result of the Proposal, individual beneficial ownership disclosure would be required only for a company’s PEO and PFO (and directors and nominees). However, companies may still be required to include other officers’ beneficial ownership in the disclosure of all directors’ and executive officers’ beneficial ownership as a group.
Item 404 of Regulation S-K
Item 404 of Regulation S-K (“Item 404”) requires disclosure of related party transactions exceeding $120,000 with, among others, directors and executive officers. An employment relationship or transaction with an executive officer (including any related compensation arising solely from that employment relationship or transaction) does not need to be disclosed pursuant to Item 404 if the compensation is disclosed pursuant to Item 402.
Practice Note: Given the proposed change in the scope of NEOs and the resulting change in compensation disclosed under Item 402, companies would likely be required to disclose compensation arrangements with executive officers other than the PEO and PFO under Item 404 absent another exception.
Interaction with Other SEC Proposals
Other pending SEC proposals could affect the Proposal’s reach and practical impact:
Filer Status
The SEC’s May 2026 filer status proposal would raise the large accelerated filer threshold to $2 billion in public float, add a five-year seasoning requirement, and classify other reporting companies as non-accelerated filers. The SEC estimates 81% of reporting companies would fall in that category, reducing executive pay disclosure by exempting them from CD&A, pay ratio, pay-versus-performance, golden parachute, and say-on-pay requirements. Investor expectations may nevertheless favor voluntary compliance. Our earlier alert described three NEOs for scaled disclosure; this Proposal would generally reduce that number to two.
Registered Offering Reform
The registered offering reform proposal would allow all issuers to incorporate Exchange Act reports into Form S-1 by reference. Combined with the proposed 120-day compensation disclosure window, this may give non-S-3 issuers more flexibility to offer securities early in the year.
Semiannual Reporting
Under the proposed semiannual reporting framework, Form 8-K would become more important for interim disclosure. Narrower Item 5.02 requirements could leave investors with less information about management and compensation changes for executive officers other than the PEO and PFO.
Future Rulemaking
Chairman Atkins has indicated that business, risk, and governance disclosure reform is next. Companies should anticipate a similar principles-based approach.
Less Prescription, More Judgment: What Companies Should Do Now
The Proposal would significantly reduce prescriptive disclosure requirements, but investors and proxy advisors may continue to expect similar levels of disclosure. Companies may continue providing information investors rely on, whether to support engagement and voting decisions or to avoid omitting material information.
Companies and compensation committees may wish to:
- Brief the compensation committee and assess future implementation needs. Identify, in consultation with counsel and other advisors, how the new tables, target-value approach, and perquisite guidance could affect data collection, disclosure controls, and committee processes. Preserve current compliance procedures until final rules become effective and applicable.
- Consider submitting comments. Comments are open until 60 days after Federal Register publication. Companies can comment directly or through trade associations on issues such as executive coverage, award valuation, perquisite guidance, non-GAAP reconciliations, and transition needs. Refer to File No. S7-2026-39.
- Review investor expectations and disclosure judgments. Use shareholder engagement to identify disclosures investors value, monitor proxy advisor responses, and consider what to disclose voluntarily. Develop a process to document materiality decisions and reasonable, good-faith perquisite determinations.
The Proposal could substantially revise future compensation disclosures by putting more weight on company judgment and communications with investors. For now, companies should continue complying with the current rules, consider commenting while the Proposal is open, and prepare to reassess disclosure practices if final rules are adopted.








