BIS Issues Interim Final Rule Targeting Remote Access to Advanced Computing
On November 16, 2026, against the backdrop of global attention on the risk of advanced chip diversion to China and predictions of intense congressional oversight of the Administration’s approach to such issues, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) filed an interim final rule for public inspection that adopts controls addressing remote access to advanced semiconductors (the “IFR”). The rule—which includes some revisions that were generally anticipated but others that were not and will have major implications for a broad set of industries—published and went into effect on November 19, 2026.
The IFR institutes the following changes:
- License requirement for data centers providing remote access to D:5/Macau customers: The IFR creates an end-use control for advanced computing items used in data centers that provide “significant” compute to or for companies headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, Country Group D:5 (U.S. arms-embargoed countries, including the People’s Republic of China (which for U.S. export control purposes includes Hong Kong) (collectively “China”)) or Macau.
- License requirement for covered advanced computing items (and related software and technology) to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, and Thailand: The IFR restores prior license requirements for advanced computing items to countries in Country Groups D:1, D:4, and D:5. Further, citing diversion risks, the IFR adds license requirements for advanced computing items to or within five additional countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, and Thailand (with an exclusion for transactions to qualifying U.S.-headquartered ultimate consignees or end users, including those with a U.S.-headquartered ultimate parent, subject to reporting by the exporter, reexporter, or transferor).
- Narrowed options for overcoming the 3A090.a presumption from the Foundry Due Diligence (“FDD”) Rule: The IFR narrows the options for front-end fabricators and outsourced assembly and test (“OSAT”) companies handling chips from integrated circuit (“IC”) designers that are not “approved” or “authorized” to overcome the presumption that “applicable advanced logic integrated circuits” are classified under Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 3A090.a and designed or marketed for data centers. The affected routes depend on the designer’s location or its ultimate parent’s headquarters.
- Rescinds key AI Diffusion Rule provisions: The IFR formally rescinds and removes most of the January 2025 AI Diffusion Rule, including a number of license exceptions and the ECCN classification for AI model weights, ECCN 4E091.
The IFR also makes a series of significant but contestable assertions about the legal status of prior AI data center deployments that involved remote access by D:5/Macau-headquartered companies.
Data center operators, cloud and computing infrastructure providers, chip designers, foundries, and OSAT companies should promptly assess how these changes may affect their customer due diligence, compliance procedures, supply chain and contractual arrangements, and enforcement risk, and consider whether to raise concerns (directly or through trade associations and other intermediaries) in agency engagement or via the 60-day public comment process.
Background
While the evolution of U.S. export controls targeting advanced computing and China has not been linear, the long-term trend line is clear: Since October 2022, BIS has progressively—albeit in fits and starts—expanded export controls on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items, as part of a larger geopolitical effort to limit the ability of companies headquartered in China to obtain the compute needed to develop and deploy frontier AI models for military and civilian purposes that have far-reaching implications for the struggle between the United States and China economically and militarily.
In January 2025, at the tail end of the Biden Administration, BIS issued the AI Diffusion Rule, which would have established a tiered, worldwide licensing framework for advanced computing items and new controls on certain AI model weights. In May 2025, under the Trump Administration and amid protests from industry and U.S. partners and allies over the impact of the AI Diffusion Rule, BIS announced that it would not enforce the AI Diffusion Rule and would replace it with a new regime, the contours of which were not fully established. Since that time, there has been a lack of clarity on the continued validity of elements of the AI Diffusion Rule that codified or reinforced previous BIS guidance.
Beyond the new and specific controls regarding remote compute access discussed below, it is a major development that this IFR formalizes the rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule while retaining License Exception Advanced Compute Manufacturing (“ACM”) and the worldwide destination scope of the advanced computing Foreign Direct Product Rule (“FDPR”) in § 734.9(h).
Overview
Effective Date and Comment Period
The IFR took effect upon publication in the Federal Register on November 19, 2026. BIS will accept public comments on revisions and additions to the rule for 60 days after publication (January 19, 2027).
Separately, § 744.24(b)(3) states that data centers already providing significant compute to companies headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, D:5/Macau before publication must obtain a license within 90 days of the effective date to continue those services or “face future export restrictions.” The scope of this provision and its interaction with the commercial recommender exception are discussed below. The IFR also provides a separate, conditional 30-day savings clause for qualifying en-route shipments.
End-Use Control for Data Centers Providing Remote Access to D:5/Macau Entities (§ 744.24)
The IFR adds 15 C.F.R. § 744.24, which requires a license to export, reexport, or in-country transfer covered advanced computing items worldwide when the exporter, reexporter, or transferor has “knowledge” at the time of the transaction that the items will be used in a data center that provides significant compute, above a 12,000,000 aggregate total processing performance (“TPP”) threshold, to or for companies headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, D:5 countries or Macau.
The new control covers items classified in ECCNs 3A090 (except 3A090.c (high-bandwidth memory/HBM)) and 4A090, as well as related .z items (e.g., 5A002.z and 5A992.z), and associated software and technology, wherever located.
Other key features of the control include:
- Threshold. The control applies when access exceeds 12,000,000 aggregate TPP at a single data center or across “linked data centers.” Linked data centers are facilities networked to share resources, balance workloads, and replicate data as a unified whole, including through digital links. Multi-site operators should assess whether their footprint may be considered aggregated and whether to separate compute serving customers headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in, Macau or destinations specified in Country Group D:5 from customers headquartered elsewhere. The threshold and the aggregation mechanics are key issues for which industry should consider submitting comments.
- Changes in use. The control applies to subsequent reexports and in-country transfers, including a change from a non-prohibited end use to providing access above the threshold to or for customers headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in, D:5/Macau after the original export, and regardless of whether the person possessing the item was party to the original transaction.
- No de minimis level. The control effectively establishes a “see-through” provision that applies to covered U.S.-origin items even after incorporation into, or commingling with, a foreign-made item. Reexporters and transferors may not rely on the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”)’s de minimis provisions when there is knowledge, at any point in the supply chain, of a prohibited end use. The preamble separately discusses continued jurisdiction over foreign-produced items subject to § 734.9(h).
- Heightened diligence standard. The IFR raises diligence standards for exporters involved with advanced computing items. Exporters are expected to obtain and retain sufficient information from foreign data centers on the data center’s own customer diligence, including whether customers are directly or indirectly owned or controlled by persons located in, headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in, D:5/Macau. A refusal or inability to provide this information will be considered a “red flag” that presumptively supplies “knowledge” for purposes of the “knowledge”-based end use controls in § 744.24(a)(1), unless resolved before proceeding. This extends due diligence responsibilities upstream in the supply chain to entities that may not ordinarily have information on all downstream users.
- “Commercial recommender system” exception. The IFR provides an exception where remote access is provided exclusively for a “commercial recommender system,” which BIS describes as having potential application for online retailers and social media companies. The definition is limited to a tool exclusively designed and used to rank, filter, or suggest products, services, or content based on user behavior, transaction history, or item attributes. Importantly, it does not cover systems designed or used to generate novel text, image, audio, video, software, or other content, or any system that incorporates such a model, even if the system also performs recommendation functions, and it is not a general exception for use by companies in the online retail or social media industries. To use the exclusion, the provider must submit information through a BIS webpage (https://www.bis.gov/si/exclusionnotesubmission), including the name of any company headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, D:5/Macau, the total TPP provided to or for that company, and the diligence performed to confirm exclusive recommender use. The IFR does not provide examples of sufficient diligence. Section 744.24(b)(2) conditions the exclusion on submission of the specified information, which will be shared with the End User Review Committee, though it does not expressly require prior BIS approval or confirmation of receipt.
Potential Enforcement Considerations
In the preamble of the IFR, BIS addresses questions it received about the existing control, § 744.23, which has required a license for the shipment of covered advanced computing items destined “for” entities headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in, a Country Group D:5 destination or Macau. BIS states that, before this IFR, it enforced the requirement under § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A), as described in its May 31, 2026, guidance, and that this IFR returns the requirement to § 744.23(a)(3)(i)(A). In the IFR, BIS provides insight into how it now appears to interpret the phrase “for an entity” in the previously established 744.23(a)(3)(i)(A). Specifically, BIS states that:
This end-use control [i.e., 744.23(a)(3)] . . . is not, and has never been limited only to exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) destined to such entities of concern as ultimate consignees or end users, but extends to exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) on behalf of these entities of concern, e.g., if an entity of concern was the purchaser in the transaction (directly or indirectly) or was the exclusive or primary (greater than 50 percent of total compute) remote end user of the data center computing capacity. (Emphasis added).
BIS adds that entities in violation of this requirement should submit a voluntary self-disclosure under 15 C.F.R. § 764.5. BIS points to its October 2023 rulemaking, which it describes as intended to address companies headquartered in Macau or countries in Country Group D:5 establishing cloud servers or data centers in other countries.
Several aspects of the preamble’s discussion may raise questions for companies assessing past and future activity.
- What qualifies a “primary” remote end user. The concept of a “primary” remote end user and the “50 percent” threshold appear in the preamble of the IFR but not in the text of the revised § 744.23, and it is unclear whether BIS has ever stated these concepts previously. In the earlier 2023 rulemaking, BIS acknowledged concerns about infrastructure-as-a-service arrangements and indicated it was still evaluating a regulatory response. See 88 FR 73458, 73467 (Topic 46).
- Past reliance on U.S. person and military intelligence controls. BIS addressed exports of advanced computing items to infrastructure-as-a-service providers in its May 2025 policy statement on training AI models. In that guidance, it described circumstances in which the catch-all controls in part 744 may require a license, namely where there is “knowledge” that models will be trained for or on behalf of D:5/Macau-headquartered parties and used for a weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) or military-intelligence end use or end user, and it did not reference § 744.23. Companies accordingly may have understood that remote access in these circumstances was governed by BIS’s controls on U.S. person activities (§ 744.6) and military-intelligence end use and end user controls (§ 744.22), rather than § 744.23.
- Voluntary self-disclosure calculus. The IFR’s preamble self-disclosure statement is directed at entities “in violation” but does not identify which past transactions BIS considers violations. In assessing whether a voluntary self-disclosure may be warranted, companies may reasonably evaluate each past transaction on its own facts, in light of the rule as written and as understood when the transaction was completed. Transactions where a D:5/Macau-headquartered entity was the actual purchaser, consignee, or end user may present a different analysis from those involving only remote access, such as through an infrastructure provider. In addition, the text of § 744.24(b)(3), which addresses certain data centers already providing significant compute before publication, does not make a voluntary self-disclosure a condition of qualifying for that window, though we expect BIS may seek to clarify this point.
- Finally, for deployments assessed to comply with prior restrictions, including applicable U.S.-person and Part 744 end-use controls, and for which no new export, reexport, or transfer of a covered advanced computing item occurs, it is unclear whether there would be a basis on which to apply either 744.23 or 744.24.
For exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) on or after the rule’s effective date, including spares and in-country transfers, companies should expect BIS to consider applying either or both § 744.23 and § 744.24. While it remains to be seen how BIS will address some of the above open issues and the level of BIS enforcement for existing deployments made in good faith, it is worth bearing in mind that companies with questions on these points—and where their past conduct stands—may raise them through the comment process, an advisory opinion request, or a meeting with BIS. To the extent not already done, companies (even those that do not engage BIS on these issues now) should be sure to document the basis on which prior arrangements were assessed and review their diligence records and compliance program design.
License Requirements Extend to Five Additional Countries
The IFR extends the license requirement for advanced chips, servers, and other computers and electronic assemblies (among other items) that contain them, to five additional countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, and Thailand. BIS will review applications under this new license requirement on a case-by-case basis and has signaled that license determinations will depend partly on how well each country addresses diversion through its own controls, as well as the country’s coordination with BIS on enforcement.
Under revised § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A), a license is now required for covered advanced computing items (3A090 except 3A0 90.c, 4A090, and related .z items, software, and technology) to or within Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil, in addition to destinations in Country Groups D:1, D:4, and D:5 (countries of national security, missile technology, and arms embargo concern, respectively, excluding those also in A:5 or A:6) and the UAE, subject to the UAE’s separate favorable treatment. BIS also warns of consequences for countries that tolerate evasion, including possible import restrictions, additional license requirements, and Entity List designations on foreign persons.
For the five-country requirement in § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1), exports, reexports, and transfers to an ultimate consignee or end user headquartered in the United States, or with a U.S.‑headquartered ultimate parent, are eligible for an exclusion, provided the exporter, reexporter, or transferor complies with § 743.10 reporting. This exclusion does not eliminate other applicable EAR license requirements. Reports are due no later than the first business day of the month following the transaction. They must include the parties’ and parent companies’ specified contact information and roles, ultimate destination and end users, each product’s paragraph-level ECCN, name/SKU, TPP and quantity, and the transaction date.
Narrowed Options for Overcoming the 3A090.a Presumption
The IFR narrows the options for fabricators and OSATs handling chips from designers that are not “authorized” or “approved” to overcome the presumption that an “applicable advanced logic integrated circuit” is classified in ECCN 3A090.a and designed or marketed for data centers. Note 1 to 3A090.a provides three routes to overcome the presumption: (a) a qualifying datasheet or attestation from an approved or authorized designer indicating that the IC is not specified in 3A090.a; (b) qualifying packaging and attestation by the fabricator; or (c) qualifying packaging and attestation by an approved OSAT. The IFR eliminates the paragraph (b) and (c) routes for designers that are located in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, D:1, D:4, D:5, or the five newly listed countries.
These expansions are significant in the context of the eligibility requirements for becoming an “approved” IC designer, which is currently restricted for entities headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, a D:5 country or Macau. IC designers in D:1 or D:4 jurisdictions or the five new countries may consider applying for “approved” status if they satisfy the applicable eligibility requirements, including the restrictions concerning D:5/Macau headquarters and ultimate parents.
Rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule
As noted above, the IFR rescinds most of the January 2025 AI Diffusion Rule, including a number of license exceptions and the ECCN classification for AI model weights, ECCN 4E091 (see Appendix). The IFR removes the AI Diffusion Rule’s controls on AI model weights (ECCN 4E091 and the related foreign direct product rule), its tiered country framework and License Exception Artificial Intelligence Authorization (“AIA”), License Exception Low Processing Performance (“LPP”), and the Data Center Validated End-User (“VEU”) authorization. It replaces a worldwide license requirement that would have gone into effect with the AI Diffusion Rule for advanced computing items with the narrower destination-based requirement described above, and it retains License Exception Advanced Compute Manufacturing (“ACM”) and the advanced computing FDP rule in § 734.9(h). To the extent companies relied on License Exceptions LPP or AIA, or the Data Center VEU authorization, they should determine whether a license is now required.
BIS has not rescinded changes to the Advanced Computing Foreign Direct Product Rule (“AC FDPR”), § 734.9(h), and has emphasized that jurisdiction under the FDPR continues even if the item is further incorporated into foreign-produced boards and servers.
Takeaways for Companies
- Map compute and customers. Companies should identify customers and end users headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in, D:5 countries or Macau, including those reached through intermediaries, and estimate aggregate TPP at each site and across linked sites. Because linked sites may be aggregated, operators that seem to fall below the threshold could still be covered.
- Revisit data center architecture, contracts, and notices. Operators should assess whether their sites may be treated as linked and confirm that customer contracts support the required diligence requests. Because an unresolved refusal or inability to provide sufficient diligence information presumptively supplies “knowledge,” exporters should confirm that they have contractually supported access to that information. Exporters, reexporters, and transferors should also implement the recipient notices required by § 744.24(e) for relevant unlicensed transactions on or after the effective date.
- Evaluate existing deployments and transition provisions. Companies already providing significant compute to or for customers headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, D:5 countries or Macau should promptly assess § 744.24(b)(3) and the commercial recommender exclusion. Separately, assess the conditional 30-day savings clause for en-route shipments.
- Prepare for the five-country regime. Companies should determine whether the U.S.‑headquartered exclusion is available and, if so, establish processes for monthly § 743.10 reporting.
- Chip designers, fabricators, and OSATs. Fabricators and OSATs should confirm each designer’s approved or authorized status and review their Note 1 to 3A090.a diligence procedures.
- Review pending and historical matters. Companies should assess past remote-access arrangements under § 744.23 and evaluate whether voluntary self-disclosure may be warranted. Given the preamble’s position that § 744.23 has always reached certain remote-access arrangements, BIS may review historical remote-access arrangements in enforcement.
- Consider commenting. Companies may submit public comments on the rule directly or through trade associations for BIS’s consideration and for potential updates to the rule.
- Appreciate the long-term geopolitical context and enforcement trend. BIS (and the broader U.S. Administration) is facing intense pressure to do more to restrict access by China to these advanced chips (and the models they enable), as well as to demonstrate that the level of U.S. enforcement matches the stakes of the national security risks. In any risk-based design for compliance programs, companies should not limit themselves to current restrictions but also consider the longer-term trend toward greater controls (including those beyond the current IFR) and likelihood of increased enforcement and scrutiny for practices that appear designed to circumvent the purpose of U.S. controls that many see as central to the geostrategic competition between the United States and China.
Appendix: Rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule
Provision | Status | Notes |
AI model weights controls (ECCN 4E091 , the model weights foreign direct product (“FDP”) rule in § 734.9(l), Red Flag 28) | Removed | BIS states that destination-based or end-use controls are a more effective way to address model weight transfers. |
Country tiers and License Exception AIA (§ 740.27) | Removed | The tiered country structure is revoked along with the exception built on it. |
License Exception LPP (§ 740.29) | Removed | Planned exports previously expected to rely on LPP should be reassessed, taking account of the conditional savings clause for qualifying en-route shipments. References to LPP are also removed from recordkeeping provisions. |
Data Center VEU Authorization (§ 748.15 and related supplements) | Removed | The Data Center VEU authorization is removed. The non-data-center VEU authorization remains, subject to conforming amendments. |
Worldwide Regional Stability (“RS”) license requirement for advanced computing items | Replaced | Narrowed to D:1, D:4, and D:5 destinations (excluding A:5/A:6) and the UAE, plus the five newly listed countries. The D:5/Macau headquartered-entity control moves back to § 744.23. |
License Exception ACM (§ 740.28) | Retained | BIS cites its value in supporting supply chains for end users outside Macau and Country Group D:5. |
Advanced computing FDP rule (§ 734.9(h)) | Retained | Although the text is unchanged, BIS emphasizes that jurisdiction continues after incorporation into a foreign-produced part, component, computer, or equipment (for example, a GPU board or server). |
Haylee Levin, an associate in the Washington, D.C. office, contributed to the writing of this article.
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