OFAC Year in Review 2023 – Part 1

2023 was another record year for U.S. sanctions and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Most prominently, OFAC continued to impose significant additional sanctions on Russia in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, building upon the sanctions actions and underlying sanctions “architecture” it developed in 2022. The year culminated with the issuance of a new Russia-related secondary sanctions authority to target foreign financial institutions that support Russia’s military-industrial base in a myriad of ways. OFAC also provided certain limited sanctions relief under its Venezuela sanctions program, principally including relief related to the Venezuelan energy sector. 

OFAC took notable actions under numerous other sanctions programs as well, including related to its Iran, Burma, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Narcotics, and Global Magnitsky sanctions programs, and also issued a new Sudan sanctions authority. OFAC also continued to focus on the virtual currency industry, on mitigating the impact of sanctions on legitimate humanitarian-related activities, and on working on a multi-agency and multi-lateral basis—especially in the case of its Russia sanctions program—to advance U.S. sanctions objectives.

Each year we reflect on the most significant U.S. sanctions developments of the past year in a multi-part series. Part One provides a refresher on OFAC’s major activities and programmatic updates from 2023. Part Two will summarize OFAC’s enforcement actions last year and their key lessons.

I. 2023 by the Numbers

Enforcement Actions

OFAC had another busy—and record-breaking—year for sanctions enforcement in 2023. It finalized 17 public enforcement actions, imposing over $1.5 billion in total monetary penalties and settlements, including the nearly $1 billion multi-agency settlement in November with Binance Holdings, Ltd. While OFAC conducted a similar level of enforcement activity in 2022 when it pursued 16 public enforcement actions, this year OFAC imposed over 36 times the $42.7 million in fines that it imposed in 2022. The historic $1.5 billion in civil monetary penalties over the course of 2023 reflects the highest aggregate penalty total for a calendar year in OFAC’s history—even beyond the record-breaking years of the major bank wire stripping enforcement actions a decade ago. The graphs below show OFAC’s 2023 enforcement activity by the number of actions and the total value of penalties in comparison to the annual totals from the past decade.

We will further discuss the enforcement actions that were published in 2023, as well as recent enforcement trends, in Part Two of our Year in Review series.

Targeting Actions

In 2023, OFAC and the U.S. Department of State undertook over 2,700 targeting actions imposing sanctions, including designations (i.e., the imposition of full blocking sanctions on individuals or entities) and identifications of blocked property (e.g., aircraft, vessels). This level of targeting activity is consistent with OFAC’s targeting activity in 2022, and reflects the Biden Administration’s significant efforts over the past two years to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine; well over half of the targeting actions in 2023 were Russia-program specific.

Outside the Russia context, OFAC and the State Department issued over 1,100 new targeting actions across other sanctions programs, consistent with the volume of actions in prior years. The highest concentrations of these actions were under the Counter-Terrorism, Iran, and Counter-Narcotics sanctions programs. OFAC also delisted over 270 individuals and entities in 2023.

Other Actions

Beyond its enforcement and targeting related efforts, OFAC issued additional sanctions authorities in 2023, including two “Directives” and nine new and amended “Determinations,” expanding the scope of the authorities and prohibitions under its existing sanctions programs (principally focused on the recent Russia sanctions program). In recent years, when crafting and expanding sanctions programs, OFAC and the U.S. government have increasingly focused on crafting broad Executive Orders (E.O.s) and then granting authority to the Secretary of the Treasury (often in consultation with other interagency partners) to issue Directives and Determinations to expand the scope of the relevant prohibitions and enable targeting of additional categories of persons or activities. This approach—which has been heavily utilized throughout the current crisis involving Russia—enables OFAC to target new categories of persons and activities more quickly in response to changing policy and/or circumstances. 

OFAC also issued 75 new or amended general licenses (GLs) across all of its sanctions programs—most of them in the Russia sanctions program—in an effort to continue to mitigate any unintended consequences of sanctions, and issued 117 new and amended Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and 19 guidance documents during the year.

II. Significant Sanctions Developments in 2023

A. Russia

Throughout 2022, the U.S. government implemented a complex sanctions “architecture” via the issuance of numerous new authorities that enabled rapid targeting of persons and activities contributing to the war in Ukraine or helping Russia to evade the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies. In 2023, the U.S. government heavily leveraged these new authorities by undertaking a similarly significant number of designation and identification actions, while continuing to identify additional sectors, services, and activities to be targeted under the established sanctions infrastructure.

One of the most notable Russia-related developments came at the end of the year, with the issuance of E.O. 14114 on December 22, 2023. The E.O. provides OFAC with new authority to sanction foreign financial institutions that have conducted or facilitated a significant transaction or provided any service involving Russia’s military-industrial base, even unwittingly. This action marks the U.S. government’s first issuance of a so-called “secondary sanctions” authority under the recent Russia sanctions program and is broadly crafted to provide OFAC with significant discretion to target those engaging in a wide variety of activities that have been determined to support Russia’s military-industrial base. OFAC issued guidance for foreign financial institutions to identify activities that present risks under the new authority and recommendations on how to mitigate these risks. Separately, E.O. 14114 also expanded certain import-related prohibitions in E.O. 14068 to target certain Russian Federation-origin products that are incorporated or substantially transformed into another product outside Russia. For further information regarding the December 22, 2023, actions, please see our prior client alert on this topic.

While the overall number of Russia-related targeting actions fell slightly in 2023 as compared to 2022, the U.S. government largely kept pace with Russia-related targeting actions last year. Targeting actions focused on those financing or otherwise enabling Russia’s military-industrial base and those helping Russia to otherwise evade U.S. sanctions and export controls (e.g., evasion related to the price cap policy). Some notable actions included the State Department’s designation in September of 37 entities involved in expanding Russia’s energy production and future export capacity, and OFAC’s designation in May of over 300 individuals and entities deemed complicit in Russia’s military-industrial supply chains and critical to Russia’s future energy revenues. OFAC also designated several additional Russian financial institutions, including Credit Bank of Moscow PJSC, Bank Saint-Petersburg PJSC, and Joint Stock Company Russian Regional Development Bank.

OFAC also identified additional sectors of the Russian Federation economy for targeting under E.O. 14024, including the metals and mining sector and the architecture, engineering, construction, manufacturing, and transportation sectors. Under the new determinations, OFAC may now target persons that are determined to operate in these sectors with blocking sanctions.

OFAC continued to build upon the targeted services ban established in E.O. 14071 of April 6, 2022. Under this authority, U.S. persons are prohibited from providing, directly or indirectly, any categories of services identified by OFAC to persons located in the Russian Federation. OFAC issued a Determination identifying architecture and engineering services as additionally subject to these prohibitions, building upon a large list of services categories targeted in 2022. 

In February 2023, OFAC issued a Determination to target certain services that relate to the maritime transport of petroleum products of Russian Federation origin and a related Determination establishing the price caps for petroleum products of Russian Federation origin, both in furtherance of the price cap policy adopted by the U.S. and coalition partners. OFAC also published several guidance documents and advisories relating to the price cap policy, many issued in coordination with the “Price Cap Coalition” (an international coalition, including the G7, the European Union, and Australia, that have agreed to prohibit the import of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin), such as the updates to the “Guidance on Implementation of the Price Cap Policy for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin” in February and December 2023, including to bolster the attestation and recordkeeping processes for maritime service providers; an October Price Cap Coalition advisory that highlights best practices in response to recent developments in the maritime oil trade; and an April alert identifying certain evasion of the price cap policy. OFAC also issued its first designations for violations of the price cap.

In May, OFAC amended Russia-related Directive 4, which prohibits transactions involving the Central Bank of Russia, the National Wealth Fund of Russia, and the Ministry of Finance of Russia (“Directive 4 Entities”), to add a new reporting requirement for U.S. persons that are in possession or control of any property in which a Directive 4 Entity has an interest. Such reports are now required annually by June 30.

Finally, over the course of the year, OFAC issued numerous new and amended GLs to mitigate unintended consequences related to its sanctions actions, and issued several new and amended FAQs to provide guidance to the public regarding the Russia-related sanctions. For example, OFAC updated certain of its FAQs related to its “new investment” prohibitions, and provided guidance regarding Russia’s so-called “exit tax” associated with divestitures of Russian businesses and the related need for a specific license in FAQ 1118.

We expect that Russia will continue to remain a major priority for the U.S. government in 2024, including efforts related to targeting Russia’s military-industrial base, evasion of the price cap policy, and those who otherwise help Russia to evade or circumvent sanctions. Even just within the first couple months of 2024, OFAC and the State Department have already issued almost 10 actions related to Russia, including multiple actions taken on February 23, 2024, to designate several hundred individuals and entities, and to identify numerous vessels as blocked property, to mark the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and following the death of Aleksey Navalny (see, e.g., On Second Anniversary of Russia’s Further Invasion of Ukraine and Following the Death of Aleksey Navalny, Treasury Sanctions Hundreds of Targets in Russia and Globally and U.S. Treasury Designates Russian State-Owned Sovcomflot, Russia’s Largest Shipping Company).

B. Venezuela

Following negotiations between the U.S. government and representatives of the Maduro regime, U.S.-Venezuela relations showed signs of a brief détente in the latter half of 2023. In exchange for new commitments by the Maduro regime—including the signing of an electoral roadmap in October between the Maduro regime and Venezuela’s opposition Unitary Platform, and a pledge to release wrongfully detained U.S. nationals—the United States issued certain time-limited GLs, effectively easing certain limited sanctions related to the Venezuelan oil and gas and gold sectors, and secondary market dealings in certain Government of Venezuela securities. 

More specifically, in October, OFAC issued the following GLs to implement this limited sanctions relief:

• Venezuela GL 43, a GL authorizing dealings with Minerven, the Venezuelan state-owned gold mining company. In addition, OFAC issued FAQ #5 in a standalone guidance document to clarify that it did not intend to target any person solely for operating in the Venezuelan gold sector, contingent on continuing positive steps by the Maduro regime toward free and fair elections in Venezuela. 
• Venezuela GL 44, a broad six-month GL authorizing transactions related to oil and gas sector operations in Venezuela, including transactions with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), subject to certain conditions and limitations.
• Venezuela GL 3I, amending GL 3 to authorize U.S. persons to purchase certain listed Venezuelan sovereign bonds on the secondary market (removing language that was previously included in the GL that barred U.S. persons from purchasing or investing in (or facilitating the purchase of or investment in) the covered bonds).
• Venezuela GL 9H, amending GL 9 to authorize U.S. persons to purchase certain “PdVSA securities” that were issued prior to August 25, 2017, on the secondary market (removing language that was previously included in the GL that barred U.S. persons from purchasing or investing in (or facilitating the purchase of or investment in) such PdVSA securities).

However, shortly after these changes, on January 29, 2024, GL 43 was revoked when OFAC issued GL 43A, which authorized the wind down of transactions involving Minerven prior to February 13, 2024. On February 2, 2024, OFAC amended its guidance regarding its targeting of persons operating in the gold sector to note that it intends to focus targeting efforts on those operating corruptly in the gold sector, and not those operating legitimately in such sector. The State Department confirmed that GL 43 was revoked in response to the Maduro regime backsliding on its October commitments, including by barring an opposition candidate from running in the upcoming presidential election. 

In further amended guidance issued on February 2, 2024, OFAC indicated that “the U.S. government intends to renew GL 44 only if the representatives of Maduro follow through with their commitments and take continued concrete steps toward a democratic election by the end of 2024.” Given OFAC’s several public statements about its intention to not renew GL 44 if further progress is not made before April 18, 2024, it appears likely that either the U.S. government will decline to renew the GL in April (with or without a short wind-down period for those who may have been engaging in activities authorized by the GL), or that such GL may be renewed for only a relatively short time period while the U.S. government continues to assess the Maduro regime’s progress toward the commitments made in October 2023.

Separate from the limited sanctions relief outlined above, OFAC issued a number of new GLs and amended certain GLs related to Venezuela in 2023. The authorizations included, for example, a GL authorizing the export of liquefied petroleum gas to Venezuela (#GL 40B); GLs authorizing certain transactions involving PdVSA necessary for the limited maintenance of essential operations in Venezuela or the wind down of operations in Venezuela for certain covered entities (GLs 8L and 8M); and GLs authorizing certain future transactions related to the PdVSA 2020 8.5 Percent Bond (i.e., authorizing, as of a future point in time, holders of interests in the defaulted PdVSA 2020 8.5 Percent Bond to collect on the collateral for such loan (interests in PdVSA’s U.S. subsidiary, PDV Holding, Inc., the parent company to CITGO Holding, Inc.), which is not currently allowed while the authorization in GL 5 remains suspended) (GLs 5J, #5K, 5L, and 5M). Notably, OFAC did not designate any persons under the Venezuela sanctions program in 2023, and it removed a number of persons from OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”) that were designated under the Venezuela sanctions program over the course of the year. 

C. Iran

OFAC further expanded sanctions on Iran in 2023, with seemingly no prospects for a renewed nuclear agreement on the horizon. These actions targeted, among other things, Iran’s support for malign actors and proxy groups and sanctions evasion. OFAC continued to designate individuals and entities involved in Iran’s production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—which Iran has supplied to Russia and which have been used to mount attacks on Ukraine—and the procurement networks enabling that industry. In June, the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, and the Treasury issued a joint advisory regarding Iran’s UAV-related activities identifying key items needed for the production of UAVs and various methodologies used by Iran to source the needed components, and in October, the same agencies issued an additional joint advisory regarding Iran’s ballistic missile procurement activities.

In December, given the attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, OFAC designated Iranian individuals and entities responsible for facilitating the flow of financial assistance to the Houthis in Yemen. In addition, after the deadly Hamas attacks in Israel last fall, OFAC similarly sanctioned members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) for their support of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) under OFAC’s counter-terrorism authorities.

Even as it took numerous designation actions related to Iran throughout the year, OFAC also took several actions in support of the Iranian people. In January 2023, OFAC issued one new FAQ and amended several existing FAQs to provide further clarity regarding the scope of Iran GL D-2, which was issued in September 2022 and relates to the provision of internet services, software, and hardware incident to communications in Iran. Further, in September, OFAC announced the establishment of a humanitarian channel in Qatar to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Iranian people. While the U.S. government has not publicly indicated any withdrawal of support for the humanitarian channel, the Iranian nexus to the Hamas attacks in Israel make it likely that the humanitarian channel may be less robust than initially expected.

D. China

The issue of Taiwan remains a lingering source of tension and potential conflict between the United States and China, with the recent election of Lai Ching-te as Taiwan’s new leader unlikely to lower any temperatures. Evidencing Congress’s strong continuing interest in China, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 includes numerous provisions to address various U.S. government concerns regarding China on a range of issues. For example, the NDAA requires a report to be developed that, among other things, will analyze the global impact that would result from any coercive actions taken by China with respect to Taiwan, and will list economic policy options—including potential sanctions and supply chain restrictions—to be deployed against China in the leadup or in response to any attempted reunification of Taiwan by force.

While the U.S. government’s sanctions actions against actors in China in 2023 were more modest, the U.S. government has continued to leverage other tools vis-à-vis China at this time (e.g., in the export controls and inbound/outbound investment spaces), and there remains significant bipartisan interest in China within Congress. The Biden Administration remains focused on China, and may receive increasing pressure to take more actions in the sanctions space, particularly as the U.S. presidential election approaches and/or in response to any escalating tensions with Taiwan or additional support for Russia’s war in Ukraine or other perceived malign activities.

E. Burma

OFAC continued to target the Burmese military regime, which took power in a military coup in February 2021. In March, OFAC published an alert identifying sanctions risks associated with the provision of jet fuel to the Burmese military, and designated several jet fuel suppliers and persons connected to Burma’s military. In August, OFAC issued a Determination pursuant to E.O. 14014 specifying that persons operating in the jet fuel sector of the Burmese economy may be targeted with sanctions. Concurrently, OFAC designated additional jet fuel suppliers in Burma. 

In late October, OFAC published Directive 1 under E.O. 14014, which prohibits U.S. persons from providing, exporting, or reexporting, directly or indirectly, any financial services to or for the benefit of Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) or its property or interests in property. This action did not block MOGE, and so all other activities involving MOGE that are not described in Directive 1 remain permitted.

F. Counter-Terrorism

OFAC took a significant number of actions under its Counter-Terrorism sanctions authorities in 2023. In particular, following the October 7 terrorist attacks by Hamas in Israel, OFAC targeted members of Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) since 1997, and its financial facilitators. Between October and December, through several additional rounds of sanctions, OFAC imposed sanctions on Hamas leaders, representatives, and operators, as well as assets in Hamas’ investment portfolio and individuals who have facilitated sanctions evasion by Hamas-affiliated companies.

G. Virtual Currency

OFAC remained focused on countering malicious activity facilitated by the use of virtual currencies. In August, a district court in Texas upheld OFAC’s 2022 designation of virtual currency mixer Tornado Cash, used by North Korean hackers to launder illicit proceeds. Shortly thereafter, OFAC designated Tornado Cash co-founder Roman Semenov, who the Justice Department has charged with money laundering and sanctions violations. In November, OFAC also designated another virtual currency mixer, Sinbad.io, which North Korea has also used to engage in money laundering.

While OFAC prevailed in the Tornado Cash lawsuit challenging its authority to impose sanctions on decentralized finance (DeFi) entities, in November, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo noted in prepared remarks at the 2023 Blockchain Association’s Policy Summit that the Treasury Department had provided Congress with a list of desired legislative reforms to better enable OFAC to go after actors in the digital asset ecosystem. The recommendations included proposals to create a secondary sanctions regime specific to the virtual currency industry, and to update certain illicit finance authorities and definitions to better account for current and emerging risks related to virtual currency.

As OFAC and the broader Treasury Department dedicate increasing resources to addressing the unique illicit finance and sanctions evasion risks and challenges related to virtual currencies, we expect OFAC to continue to focus on the virtual currency industry, particularly in its enforcement and targeting efforts.

H. Cyber

OFAC made several noteworthy cyber-related designations in 2023. In February and September, OFAC sanctioned members of the Russia-based Trickbot cybercrime group, which has targeted U.S. critical infrastructure. In April, OFAC designated Genesis Market, an illicit marketplace that fueled the theft and sale of device credentials and related sensitive information. In May, OFAC sanctioned a developer of several ransomware variants for cyber attacks that targeted U.S. law enforcement entities, businesses, and critical infrastructure, and in December, it designated two individuals associated with an advanced persistent threat (APT) group notorious for spear phishing attacks and known to be sponsored by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).

I. Counter-Narcotics/Illicit Drug Trade

In 2023, OFAC had significant targeting activity under its counter-narcotics program, principally pursuant to its revamped illicit drugs authority, E.O. 14059. OFAC issued 19 distinct designation actions over the course of the year under this program with a principal focus on operators within Mexico and China that were determined to be contributing to the illicit fentanyl trade and U.S. opioid crisis.

J. Sudan 

In further response to the military coup in Sudan in 2021, President Biden issued E.O. 14098 in May, establishing a new sanctions authority related to the Sudanese military’s seizure of power. OFAC issued its first designations under the new authority in June, and took additional actions in September and December. Concurrent with the June designations, and consistent with its current practice to proactively authorize certain humanitarian-related transactions, OFAC issued a number of GLs, including relating to official business of certain international organizations (GL 1), transactions in support of nongovernmental organizations’ activities (#GL 2), and the provision of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices, and the extraction, processing, transport, sale, or distribution of water in Sudan (GL 3).

K. International Human Rights Day and Other Actions Related to Corruption and Human Rights Abuses

Continuing its annual tradition of imposing sanctions to mark Human Rights Day (last year also marked the 75th Anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), in December, OFAC and the State Department designated officials in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Iran, Liberia, South Sudan, and Uganda that were determined to be involved or otherwise complicit in human rights abuses. Since 2022, OFAC has designated more than 150 persons around the globe for human rights abuses.

Throughout 2023, OFAC took several additional notable actions related to human rights abuses and corruption, including to designate the former President of Paraguay and the then-current Vice President in January, five current or former Bulgarian government officials in February, the former President of the Haitian Chamber of Deputies in April, three Nicaraguan judicial officials in April, and two former Afghan government officials and 44 associated entities in December.

L. Hostage Taking and Wrongful Detention

In April, OFAC and the State Department issued their first designations under the authority provided by E.O. 14078, issued by President Biden in July 2022, to combat the wrongful detention and hostage taking of U.S. nationals and other persons abroad. The designations included Russia’s FSB (which has been designated under numerous other authorities in the past) and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO), as well as several senior officials of the IRGC-IO.

In September, the State Department designated the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) (which has been designated under numerous other authorities in the past), and OFAC designated Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former President of Iran, for their roles regarding the capture of U.S. citizen Robert Levinson in 2007. In July, OFAC published the Hostages and Wrongful Detention Sanctions Regulations to implement E.O. 14078.

M. Humanitarian Authorizations

In 2023, OFAC continued to issue authorizations and guidance relating to humanitarian transactions in an effort to ensure the legitimate provision of humanitarian goods and services can continue, even in comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions, and jurisdictions where a blocked regime or party is in power and may have touchpoints to humanitarian transactions. In February, OFAC issued supplemental guidance on the provision of humanitarian assistance, expanding upon a 2014 guidance document that was issued on the same topic, and highlighting the new humanitarian-related GLs issued across programs by OFAC in December 2022.

In addition, OFAC renewed its COVID-19 related GLs in place under the Iran, Syria, and Venezuela sanctions programs, and issued a new fact sheet providing further guidance regarding these COVID-19 related GLs. OFAC also issued new GL 23 under the Syria program authorizing certain transactions related to earthquake relief, and issued a related guidance document regarding earthquake-related transactions. In August, OFAC updated that guidance document to focus more broadly on the provision of humanitarian assistance to Syria. 

In June, OFAC and the His Majesty’s Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) in the UK published a joint fact sheet regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance involving Russia to highlight relevant authorizations, exceptions, and guidance available under both jurisdictions’ Russia sanctions programs. This fact sheet further highlights the continuing high level of coordination between the U.S. and its allies on Russia-related issues.

Finally, in November, OFAC issued Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinian People in response to questions from non-governmental organizations and the public regarding how to support the Palestinian people while remaining compliant with OFAC sanctions on Hamas and other designated persons in the region.

N. Tri-Seal Compliance Note on Voluntary Self-Disclosure of Potential Violations

In July, OFAC and the Departments of Commerce and Justice issued a Tri-Seal Compliance Note describing the voluntary self-disclosure (VSD) policies that apply to U.S. sanctions, export controls, and other national security laws, including recent updates to the VSD policies of these agencies. Among other guidance, OFAC reiterated that a disclosure of apparent violations will not be treated as a VSD if it is not self-initiated, including when the disclosure comes in response to a subpoena or other inquiry from OFAC, is made without the authorization of senior management, or is included as part of a license application to OFAC. OFAC also said it will determine on a case-by-case basis whether a VSD to another agency qualifies as a VSD for OFAC’s purposes. 

With respect to potential criminal violations of sanctions laws, the Justice Department announced that it will have a presumption in favor of a non-prosecution agreement and no payment of a fine where a company voluntarily self-discloses potential criminal violations to the Justice Department, fully cooperates, and timely and appropriately remediates the violations where there are no aggravating factors present. Finally, the guidance also highlighted the whistleblower program maintained by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which is designed to incentivize individuals to provide tips to the U.S. government regarding violations of sanctions laws, in addition to violations of the Bank Secrecy Act.

O. Other Multi-Agency and Multilateral Compliance Notes and Advisories

OFAC continued to partner with other agencies to issue guidance and advisories on current sanctions issues to aid the private sector in understanding and complying with U.S. sanctions. In addition to the multi-agency advisories and alerts noted in the topic-specific sections above, other multi-agency notes and advisories published by OFAC in 2023 included a tri-seal compliance note issued by the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and the Treasury in March regarding the use of third-party intermediaries to evade Russia sanctions and export controls; an advisory on the gold industry in Africa issued by the Departments of State, the Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Labor, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in June; and a quint-seal compliance note issued by the Departments of Commerce, State, Justice, the Treasury, and Homeland Security on “Know Your Cargo” best practices for the shipping and transportation industries issued in December.

In 2023, the U.S. government also continued to work closely with allies and other partners, in particular with regard to the administration and enforcement of the respective jurisdictions’ Russia sanctions programs. This continued close coordination led to the issuance of numerous joint guidance documents and advisories, such as the price cap guidance and humanitarian guidance noted above, and the Global Advisory on Russian Sanctions Evasion issued jointly by the multilateral Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force in March. 

III. Conclusion

2023 was another significant year in the world of sanctions. MoFo’s National Security Practice would be happy to discuss any of the issues raised in this alert in more detail and looks forward to keeping our readers current on key sanctions developments in 2024.